IF MEN WERE ANGELS: THE NEW
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
ScoTr FRUEHWALD*

"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls
on government would be necessary."
James Madison (The FederalistNo. 51)1
I. INTRODUCtiON: JUDGE WILKINSON'S VIEW OF THE NEW JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM

In his concurrence to Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute,
Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III proclaimed a new judicial activism
in constitutional jurisprudence--one in which judges are structural
referees.2 The hallmark of this new activism "is an interest in reviving
* Lecturer, the University of Alabama School of Law. B.M., University of Louisville;
M.A., University of North Carolina; Ph.D., City University of New York; J.D., University of
Louisville; L.L.M., University of Virginia. The author would like to thank the University of
Alabama Law School Foundation and the Edward Brett Randolph Fund for their support.
1. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961).
2. 169 F.3d 820, 895 (4th Cir. 1999) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring), cert. granted,
Brzonkala v. Morrison, 144 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1999). Of course, Chief Judge Wilkinson was not
the first person to have recognized a new period of activism in the Rehnquist Court's cases.
See, e.g., A Court Running in the Wrong Direction,N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1995, at A20; Donald
Zeigler, The New Activist Court, 45 AM. U.L. REv. 1367 (1996). However, I have chosen
Chief Judge Wilkinson's concurrence as the starting point for this article because he clearly
stated the tenets of the new judicial activism.
Although some of the cases examined in this article date back to 1992, early scholarly
discussions of these decisions were often uncertain as to their effect. See, e.g., Vicki C.
Jackson, Federalismand the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2180, 2205 (1998); John B. Attanasio, Forward:Stages of Federalism, 42 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 485, 493-94 (1998). While a few articles did predict the strong effect these cases would
have on constitutional jurisprudence, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995),
others predicted that the cases would have little effect, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Listening to the "Sounds of Sovereignty" but Missing the Beat-Does the New FedralismReally
Matter? 32 IND. L. REV. 11 (1998) ("Congress remains free to buy that which it cannot
directly command." ld. at 25); Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94
MICH. L. REv. 651 (1995); Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
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the structural guarantees of dual sovereignty.' 3 The era began in 1992
with New York v. United States4 "in which the Supreme Court held that
the 'take title' provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985 impermissibly coerced the states into passing
legislation."5 Since then, the Court has invalidated several statutes on
the ground that Congress exceeded its authority in passing those statutes
and intruded on the states' sovereignty.' The areas in which the Court
has felt that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority have
included (1) enactment of statutes under its commerce power that
regulated noncommercial areas of traditional state concern,7 (2) use of
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to alter the Fourteenth
Amendment's meaning,8 and (3) abrogation of state sovereign
immunity.9 In addition, the Court "has enforced the 'etiquette of
federalism,' barring Congress from 'commandeer[ing] the legislative
processes of the States,' and forbidding the national government from
'impress[ing] the state executive into its service' by 'command[ing] the
state officers... to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program.""° In sum, as Judge Wilkinson has declared, "[t]aken as a

whole, the decisions preserve Congress as an institution of broad but
enumerated powers, and the states as entities having residual sovereign
rights. "1
Judge Wilkinson asked, "[w]ill the current era of judicial scrutiny
stand the tests of time and public acceptance any better than the prior
eras have?"' 2 These prior periods of judicial activism were the
"Lochner" era at the beginning of the twentieth century in which courts
REV. 643 (1996); Jesse H. Choper, Did Last Term Reveal "A Revolutionary States' Rights
Movement" within the Supreme Court,46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663 (1996); Suzanna Sherry,
The Barking Dog, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 877 (1996).
3. 169 F.3d at 893.
4. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). One might argue that it began a year earlier with Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), which held that the Federal Discrimination in Employment Act
did not apply to the mandatory retirement age for Missouri state judges. See generally 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1998).
5. Brzonkala,169 F.3d at 892.
6. See id. at 892-93.
7. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,561 (1995).
8. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 893.
10. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 893 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561) (Kennedy, J., concuring)
(alteration in original) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161)(quoting Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997)).
11. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 893.
12- Id.
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struck down progressive legislation, such as laws protecting union
members and minimum wage laws, on substantive due process grounds
("liberty of contract") and commerce clause grounds, 3 and the Warren
Court-Early Burger Court era in which the Court found "new
substantive rights in the Constitution and down played the document's
structural mandates." 4 Commentators have strongly condemned the
Lochner era and criticized aspects of the Warren Court-Early Burger
Court period 5
Critics castigated the Lochner era's liberty of contract decisions on
the ground that the Court was "indulging its 'judicial sense of what was
good for the business community' and ignoring the plight of the
common citizen., 16 These writers thought that the Court was "picking
and choosing without principle... 'simply because... [the statutes
were] passed to carry out economic views which the Court believe[d] to
be unwise or unsound."'1 7 These commentators also reproached the
Court for inconsistency in its commerce clause decisions.
Such
decisions "solidified the image of an obstructionist Supreme Court,
determined to impede legislative efforts to reverse the era's economic
dysfunction and to ease the human suffering that it had wrought." 9
Judge Wilkinson summed up the first period of judicial activism:
The century's first era of judicial activism proved a painful
experience for the courts, as well as for the nation. Battered by
court-packing proposals and chastened by a wholesale change in
personnel, the Court eventually abandoned the business of
reviewing state and federal regulation of economic activity.
Indeed, the reaction to the Court's early excesses was so strong
that many supposed for a time that limits on the commerce
power had become non-existent. And the Lochner specter of
result-oriented activism still haunts the Court's debates today.2
While the reputation of the Warren Court-Early Burger Court is
13. Id. at 890-91.
14. Id. at 892.

15. See id.
at 890-92.
16. Id.at 890 (quoting

ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL

SUPREMACY 164 (1941)).
17. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 890 (citing, Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,562
(1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting)).
18. Brzonkala,169 F.3d at 890-91.
19. Id. at 891.
20. Id. (citation omitted).
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much better than that of the Lochner court, scholars have also strongly
criticized certain features of that time, and the excesses of that period
guaranteed a "cyclical correction "-the new judicial activism. 2 Judge
Wilkinson observed that "[s]ome decisions overextended the
institutional capacity of the federal courts, installing judges as long-term
supervisors of basic state functions."'
He added that "[o]ther
constitutional rulings were simply ridden too far, and the Court
eventually had to rein them in. " He concluded that
[a]lthough many of its individual decisions were overdue and
salutary, when the era is considered as a whole, the states were
relegated to second-class constitutional status.
As states
themselves began to respect the civil rights of all their citizens,
however, the justification for additional restrictions began to
wear thin."
Judge Wilkinson asserted that the new judicial activism does not
suffer from the same problems as the other two periods of judicial
activism. He wrote:
[y]et upon closer scrutiny, the current wave of judicial decisions
bears little relation to those which crested early in this century.
If one remains attentive to the pitfalls of the past, the present
jurisprudence holds the promise to be an enduring and
constructive one, for its aims and means differ significantly from
those of prior eras.'
First, unlike the two earlier periods of judicial activism, the new
judicial activism is substantively neutral: "the cases of the present era
cannot be seen as single-mindedly promoting the interests of a particular
constituency. "6 Judge Wilkinson noted that "[a]s a matter of oxen, the
21. See id. at 892.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. Justice Thomas has written concerning the Court's decisions before the reaction
began, "[o]ur construction of the scope of congressional authority has the additional problem
of coming close to turning the Tenth Amendment on its head. Our case law could be read to
reserve to the United States all powers not expressly prohibitedby the Constitution." Lopez,
514 U.S. at 589 (Thomas, J., concurring).
25. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 893.
26. Id. Erwin Chemerinsky has labelled the new activism a "conservative judicial
activism." Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is a Constitutional
Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601, 602 (1998) [hereinafter Chemerinsky,

1999]

THE NEW JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

gored are determined by infringements upon our federal system, not by
judicial disdain for enacted policies."' Consequently, "[i]n the present
period, preservation of federalism values-not the maintenance of
laissez faire-isthe binding principle. "28
Second, the cases in the current period arise out of many factual
contexts; they do not involve constant clashes between business and
labor interests, as most of the cases in the Lochner era did.29 As Judge
Wilkinson observed, even though many interest groups are involved in
these decisions, "the identity and alignment of those groups varies,
foreclosing the possibility that the judiciary will be seen as politically
choosing sides in a single epic struggle."°
Third, the new judicial activism treats textual interpretation
differently than the other two periods. 31 In the first era, the Court
adopted a very narrow meaning of "commerce," significantly restricting
congressional power, while, in the second era, it gave Congress broad
authority under the same clause.2 In the third era, "[c]ourts are not
motivated by a desire that a particularsubstantive meaning be given to a
constitutional term such as commerce, but instead by the duty to find
that some meaning must exist."33 Judge Wilkinson asserted:
[t]he Supreme Court affirmed in Lopez the notion that
"commerce" must mean something short of everything ....
This
is not a radical principle. Rather than lashing out to greatly
confine national power, the judiciary is proceeding, cautiously, to
find a limiting principle at the margin. The Lopez limit on
RFRA]. The new activism is certainly not conservative in the sense that the first period of
judicial activism was. That period protected conservative "interests," in particular, big
business, while the current period does not appear to play favorites among interest groups.
Still, the new activism does emphasize values often associated with conservatism-federalism
and respecting the constitutions structural lines, so one might label it conservative in that
sense. However, as noted throughout this paper, the new judicial activism, when properly
applied, does not otherwise favor one set of values over another, but rather allocates the
authority to make value choices to the proper democratic body. That democratic body may
well choose to further liberal values. If I were forced to put a label on the new judicial
activism, I would classify it as moderate because it is not intended to favor either a
conservative or liberal extreme.
27. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 893.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

L at 894.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
at 894-95.

33. ld.
at 894.
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Congressional power is not a strict one, but it is a limit.'
Finally, the courts' role in the new judicial activism "is not as
substantive adjudicators, but as structural referees."35 Judge Wilkinson
asserted that "[i]nstead of aggressively pursuing substantive preferences,
this court validates a structural principle [federalism] found throughout
the Constitution..., [which is] essential to the continued vitality of our
federal system."36 Unlike the two earlier periods of judicial activism
which "attempted to remove the subject matter of those cases from
political debate altogether .... [T]he present jurisprudence of
federalism is purely allocative, standing for the simple proposition that
the Constitution does not cast states as mere marionettes of the central
37
government. "'
In doing so, "[t]his jurisprudence removes no
substantive decision from the stage of political debate."3 s Thus,
[s]tates remain free after New York to reach regional solutions to
their hazardous waste problems, after Lopez to criminalize the
act of bringing a firearm within a school zone, after Printz
voluntarily to cooperate with federal law enforcement efforts,
and after today's decision to provide civil remedies to women
who are battered or raped. No court blocks the path of
legislative initiative in any of these substantive areas. 9
Judge Wilkinson noted that courts have often policed the structural
lines in the Constitution in areas such as separation of powers,
abstention, the primacy of state law, the doctrine of adequate and
independent state grounds, the jurisprudence of pre-emption, and rules
governing habeas jurisprudence.' Accordingly, he declared:
[t]he judiciary rightly resolves structural disputes. Just as the
relationship of the Bill of Rights to the Fourteenth Amendment
was a legitimate structural question for the Court, so too is the
debate over the relationship of Article I, Section 8 to the Tenth
Amendment. It is just as important for the federal government
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 895 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 895-96.
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to live within its enumerated powers as it is for state
governments to respect the Bill of Rights. Insisting on both sets
the state-federal balance right.4 '
In this paper, I will examine the new judicial activism in theory
and in practice and evaluate its validity in the areas in which the Court
has used it to limit Congressional power. I will also identify other areas
where the new judicial activism may be emerging, such as limits upon a
state's power over the individual and the relationship of the states. I will
conclude that the new judicial activism provides a promising method of
handling the diversity that exists in modem society, but that the Court
has ignored some of its basic principles in certain cases, producing
results in those cases that are unprincipled and even ideologically
biased. I will argue that, to make the new judicial activism a legitimate
means of constitutional analysis, the Court should adhere to the
structural principles contained in the Constitution's clear text, rather
than employing general notions of federalism that are not anchored in
the Constitution's words.
In Part II of this paper, I will set forth the criteria by which I will
judge the new judicial activism's decisions. In Part III, I will evaluate
those cases that have limited Congress's power to pass statutes that
infringe upon state sovereignty under Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Part
IV, I will study the decisions that have enforced the "etiquette of
federalism," by forbidding Congress from "commandeering the
legislative process of the states" or "commanding the state officers... to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." In Part V, I will
criticize those cases that have limited Congress's ability to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. Finally, in Part VI, I will examine other areas in
which the new judicial activism may have an influence.
H. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING NEW JUDICIAL ACTIVISM DECISIONS
The two most important criteria for judging a new judicial activism
case are (1) whether it respects the judicial role in our tri-partite
government and (2) whether it enforces the structural lines set forth in
the Constitution, especially those that regulate the relationship of the
federal government and the states-federalism.

41. Id. at 896.
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A. The Role of the Judge:JudicialActivism v. JudicialRestraint
The first question in evaluating a new judicial activism decision
concerns the role of judges in our constitutional system. Our
government consists of three independent branches-the executive, the
legislative, and the judiciary, and the constitutional requirement of
separation of powers mandates that one branch may not intrude upon
another's domain. Within this scheme, the legislature makes the laws,
and the judiciary interprets those laws and applies them to legal
disputes. The judiciary is not supposed to "make law," at least not in
those areas in which the legislature has acted. Judges, of course, can
invalidate laws when they are unconstitutional.
Progressive scholars and judges in the first third of the twentieth
century harshly criticized the first period of judicial activism because it
struck down economic and social welfare laws on due process grounds.4'
These thinkers thought that the courts, rather than following sound legal
principles, were applying their own notions of what the law should be.
For example, in his famous Lochner dissent, Justice Holmes wrote:
[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the State or of Laissez faire. It is made for people of
fundamentally differing views and the accident of... [judges]
finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even
shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution
of the United States.43
These scholars and judges advocated judicial restraint-that courts
should not invalidate legislation, but, rather, should allow reasonable
exercises of legislative power.4
One of the justifications for judicial restraint is that when judges
invalidate legislatively-enacted laws, they are interfering with
democracy 5 -the so-called "anti-majoritarian" difficulty.4 But, as many
42. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. See also MORTON J. HORWITz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 37,33-35, 156-59 (1992); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract,18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).

43. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
44. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF
LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 155 (1988) [hereinafter WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL
TRADITION].

45. For example, Professor Horwitz has written concerning Justice Holmes: "If law is
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modem scholars recognize, part of the courts' role is antimajoritarianto protect minorities from overreaching by the majority.' Obviously,
the legislative and executive branches cannot effectively police
themselves.'

Thus, despite the doubts mentioned above, courts have

the duty of judicial review-the power to invalidate unconstitutional
government action 9
For example, Justice Kennedy has written concerning the
importance of judicial review:
Although it is the obligation of all officers of the government to
respect the constitutional design... the federal balance is too
essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital
a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene
when one or the other level of the Government has tipped the
scales too far.Similarly, Professor Redish has asserted that "the Supreme Court
must intensify its enforcement of the constitutional provisions dealing
with political structure, for the simple reason that the Constitution's text
unambiguously dictates the existence of a specific governmental form." 5'
Many scholars, however, believe that, to avoid subverting the
democratic principles set forth in the Constitution, the courts must limit
merely politics, then the legislature should in fact decide." HORWITZ, supra note 42, at 142.
Judge Hand went as far as to question the legitimacy of judicial review on the basis that
judicial review was incompatible with the separation of powers. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS 10-11 (1958).
46. See G. EDWARD WHITE, INTERVENTION AND DETACHMENT: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 7-10 (1994) [hereinafter, WHITE, INTERVENTION AND
DETACHMENT]; see also, LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10-12,
61-66 (1988).
47. See, eg., WHITE, INTERVENTION AND DETACHMENT, supra note 46, at 9-10;
MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCrURE 5, 7-9 (1995).
48. See REDISH, supra note 47, at 8 (1995).
49. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803); see also REDISH,
supra note 47, at 8; see also, WHrrE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 44, at
460; A. E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a Recurrence
to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 789, 791 (1985) ("[I]t is hard to escape the
conclusion that the Founders assumed that limiting national power in order to protect the
states would be as much a part of the judicial function as any other issue.").
50. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (citation omitted) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also John C.
Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 27, 33 (1998)
[hereinafter Yoo, Sounds ofSovereignty].
51. REDISH, supra note 47, at 6. He later added that "[t]he long-term values embodied
in the constitutional provisions establishing political structure are both too important and too
vulnerable to justify judicial failure to enforce them." Id. at 164.
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judicial review to the Constitution's clear language.5 2 As Professor
Redish has asserted:
[i]t is only when the text of the countermajoritarian governing
document provides a rule of behavior or structure that is

contravened by majoritarian action that the unaccountable
judiciary has license to invalidate that action. Hence, in a
democracy the only justification for judicial review by a
nonrepresentative governmental organ is the desire to insure that

the majoritarian branches adhere to the countermajoritarian
limitations imposed by the Constitution.53
In sum, judicial activism that is not grounded in the constitutional
text is improper. Equally improper is when the Court ignores a
constitutional violation on the basis that courts should defer to the
legislative will.' The Court's appropriate role lies between these
extremes: The Court should invalidate Congress's actions when they
clearly violate the Constitution's structural limitations, but not expand
the structural limitations beyond the text based on a sense of what the
Court thinks those limitations should be.
B. Federalism

The key feature of the new judicial activism is that its proponents
want the Supreme Court to give as much attention to the Constitution's
52. See REDISH, supra note 47, at 8. I am not advocating that courts adopt a rigid
formalism. One can respect the Constitution's formal structures without being mechanical.
As Professor Redish has pointed out:
a commitment to adherence to text in constitutional interpretation does not
necessarily imply acceptance of a kind of static originalism. One can reasonably
believe that the outer limits of constitutional text constrain judicial interpretation,
yet find that within those limits the interpreter has freedom to adapt and apply
concepts to changing conditions .... The mode of interpretation I employ
throughout my analysis of the Constitution's structural provisions is a type of
"pragmatic formalism"-one that rejects the constraints that flow from an all-ornothing approach to constitutional interpretation.
Id. at 9. In addition a great deal of constitutional history does not "translate" well. Lynn
Baker, The Revival of States' Rights: A Progress Report and a Proposal,22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 95, 104 (1998).
53. REDISH, supra note 47, at 8.
54. Professor Redish has asserted that not enforcing the structural clauses is an improper
form of judicial activism when done because of disagreement with their substantive impact.
Id. at 164.
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structural aspects, as it does to its individual liberty provisions." Martin
Redish noted that the Constitution "was primarily devoted to the
implementation of an intricate and innovative political theory-a
constitutionally
limited,
federally structured,
representative
democracy."" Similarly, Justice O'Connor declared in New York:
Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the form

of our government, and the courts have traditionally invalidated
measures deviating from that form. The result may appear
"formalistic" in a given case to partisans of the measure at issue,
because such measures are typically the product of the era's
perceived necessity. But the Constitution protects us from our
own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and
among branches of government precisely so that we may resist
the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an
expedient solution to the crisis of the day.

The structural elements of the Constitution place significant
limitations on the federal government's powers. For example, Judge
Niemeyer declared in his Brzonkala concurrence:
Over 200 years ago, issues regarding the scope of the new
national government's powers dominated the debates
surrounding the ratification of the Constitution. What had
emerged from Philadelphia in 1787 was a legal text creating a
government constructed upon principles of federalism. The
Constitution accomplishes this result by limiting the power of the
national government, and giving it only enumerated powers.'
55. See, eg., Frank H. Easterbrook, Formalism, Functionalism, Ignorance, Judges, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 14 (1998) ("The text of the Constitution is about structure-about
form." Ild.
at 18); see also, John C. Yoo, The JudicialSafeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1311 (1997) [hereinafter, Yoo, JudicialSafeguards]; Calebresi, supra note 2, at 811-26;
REDISH, supra note 48, at 3-6, passim ("[o]ne of the primary elements of my thesis is that
because the political structure envisioned in the Constitution is so central to the values that
inhere in the concept of limited government (namely, the avoidance of tyranny and the
preservation of individual liberty), the provisions that dictate that structure need to be
enforced by the Supreme Court with considerably more consistency and enthusiasm than they
generally have been to date." Id.at 4-5); but see Herbert Hovenkamp, JudicialRestraint and
Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2219-20 (1996); Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
Some Notes on a NationalNeurosis,41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
56. REDISH, supranote 47, at 3.
57. New York, 505 U.S. at 187.
58. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 903 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
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Similarly, James Madison wrote, "[tlhe powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite."59 Thus, "the local or municipal authorities form distinct and
independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their
respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is
subject to them, within its own sphere."60 As Justice Kennedy has noted,
"federalism was the unique61 contribution of the Framers to political
science and political theory."
Under our federal system, the federal government asserts its
authority over individuals, not states.62 As Justice Scalia has observed,
"the Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would
act upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in which
the state and federal governments would exercise concurrent authority
over the people-who were, in Hamilton's words, 'the only proper
objects of government.' "' Under this scheme, "[t]he Constitution thus
contemplates a State's government will represent and remain
accountable to its own citizens. "'
Federalism protects individual liberty.6 The Court in New York
proclaimed the purpose of the Constitution's federalism provisions:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for
the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political
entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing
the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority
between federal and state governments for the protection of
individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: "Rather,
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
Cranch) at 176).
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 328 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 25 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
61. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also REDISH, supra note 47, at
3-6.
62. Printz, 521 U.S. at 919-20.
63. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 159 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)).
64. Printz, 521 U.S. at 919-20.
65. Professor Redish has observed that "[e]ven a casual review of the essence of
American constitutional theory reveals that any purported dichotomy between constitutional
structure and constitutional rights is a dangerous and false one." REDISH, supra note 47, at 4.

1999]

THE NEW JUDICIALACTIVISM

diffusion of sovereign power ....

Just as the separation and

independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive
power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse from either front."66
Likewise, James Madison wrote:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by
the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will control each
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.67
These structures are mainly intended to protect the people, not the
states, as confirmed by the fact that the states cannot "consent" when
Congress exceeds its authority under these structures." As Professor
Yoo has written, "[s]overeignty is not maintained for sovereignty's sake,
but instead is necessary to check those driven by power for power's
sake.""
Federalism not only protects minorities, it also protects the majority
from federal government overreaching. As Professor Redish has
declared, "the structural portions of the Constitution .... may also be
seen as propholytic insurance of the rights of the majority-in other
words, as protection against usurpation of sovereign power by those in
authority from those whom they represent."70
For federalism's protections to be effective, there must be two "lines
of political accountability: one between the citizens and the federal
government; the second between the citizens and the States. "7' For this
66. New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (citations omitted); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. The
Lopez Court stated that "[th]is constitutionally mandated division of authority 'was adopted
by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties."' Id. (quoting Gregory, 501
U.S. at 458); see also REDISH, supranote 47, at 4.
67. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 51, at 357 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961).
68. United States v. New York, 505 U.S. at 182.
69. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty, supra note 50, at 32.
70. REDISH, supra note 47, at 5.
71. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Professor Yoo has declared: "[if]
the states cannot act as political entities with some degree of independence, their ability to
define and enforce individual rights will be damaged." Yoo, JudicialSafeguards, supra note
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scheme to work, the people must be able to ascertain which of the two

governments to hold accountable. 2 As Justice Kennedy has declared,
"[w]ere the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire
areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the

regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres
of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility
would become illusory."73 Or, as Justice O'Connor has noted, "[t]hese
twin powers will act as mutual restraints only if both are credible."74
One might ask whether in the modem world the people need this
two-tiered layer of protection.' The simple (and correct) answer is that
this protection is mandated by the Constitution, and it can only be
changed by amendment. Equally important, observation of federalism
principles is one way of dealing with the diversity of our modem
society. 6 Justice Kennedy has declared that "[i]n this circumstance, the
theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may
perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various
solutions where the best solution is far from clear."'

More fundamentally, federalism permits people to choose the type
of society in which they wish to live.7' Professor Krotoszynski has
asserted, "pluralism is conducive to liberty because it facilitates choice,
which in turn leads to diverse laws reflecting the sensibilities of local
communities." 79 For example, one state may wish to permit same-sex
55, at 1314.
72. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575-76.
73. Id. at 577 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 155-69).

74. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991).
75. Some critics have argued that federalism is not suitable for our modem world
because we need national, rather than piecemeal, solutions and because change is too slow on
the state level. See, e.g., Alpheus Thomas Mason, JudicialActivism: Old and New, 55 VA. L.
REV. 385, 391 (1969); Harold J. Laski, The Obsolescence of Federalism, 98 NEW REPUBLIC
367 (1939).
76. Daniel Elazar has declared: "An increasing number of people have found
federalism.., to be an extraordinarily important element in both the maintenance and the
containment of pluralism." DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 99 (1987).

Similarly, Professor Redish has noted, "a reinvigoration of the Constitution's structural
provisions is called for, not simply because the Framers intended that these provisions play an
important role, but because their vigorous enforcement today remains essential to the
attainment of the goals of our political system." REDISH, supra note 47, at 6.
77. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
78. Professor Hart has called this "an enrichment of equipment for successful social
life." Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv.
489,490 (1954).
79. Krotoszynski, supra note 2, at 21.
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marriage, while another may not. Similarly, a mostly urban state may
want gun control, while a largely rural state may not. Why should all
states have to make the same choice? As Professor Kreimer has
declared:
[o]ne of the virtues of a territorial federalism is precisely that it
allows conflicting communities of commitment to coexist within a
single national polity, while allowing individuals to move fluidly
among them. On issues of fundamental life choices, America has
often been a house divided, with the individual citizens entitled
to decide the rooms in which they wish to live.'
Professor Hart has similarly noted, "[t]he resulting disparities in the
formal law of different states are notable chiefly as reflections of a
necessary independence and even competition in the wise guidance of
social affairs, entailing in most cases no sacrifice of any comparably
important social value."8 ' In addition, different states have different
needs; California's problems are not the same as Alaska's.
Daniel Elazar has argued that our nation includes three distinct
subcultures: 1) the "traditionalist," 2) the "moralistic," and 3) the
"individualistic."' The traditionalist stresses continuity and hierarchy
and is centered in the South. The moralistic emphasizes social and civic
virtues and is centered in New England. The individualistic stresses
libertarian concepts of privation and views the states as serving a
minimalistic role and is located in the middle states and the West.8
While immigration patterns have diluted these subcultures, there is
"considerable evidence of their continued existence,"' and recent
foreign immigration has created additional subcultures in American
society. Law should allow these subcultures to flourish.
If local decisions are made on the federal level, the ability to allow
80. Seth F. Kreiner, Territorialityand Moral Dissensus: Thoughts on Abortion, Slavery,
Gay Marriageand Family Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 161, 163 (1996); see also DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 95-96 (1995); REDISH, supra note 47, at 25 ("[I]f the
inferior governmental level attempts to impose tyrannical rule, its citizens have available the
safety valve of interstate mobility."); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (arguing that if the number of localities were
infinite, individuals would migrate to jurisdictions where the combination of services and

taxes match their preferences).
81. Hart, supra note 78, at 491.
82. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALIsM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 85-116

(1966).
see also SHAPIRO, supra note 80, at 86-87.
83. See id.;
84. SHAPIRO, supra note 80, at 86-87.
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individuals more freedom to structure their lives will be impeded. As
Professor Redish has declared: "it is quite conceivable that a majority of
states may favor a policy that negatively affects the remaining states.
The majority could control the decisions of Congress, leaving the
minority unprotected. "'
Or, as Professor Stewart has observed, "[u]niform national
regulations have undermined decentralized diversity and selfdetermination."" He has further pointed out that modern battles
between factions are fought not in Congress, but in federal court." He
has declared:
This system of policy making circumvents many of the political
safeguards of federalism that are supposed to make national
policies sensitive to state and local concerns. The rhetoric of
rights has reinforced and given a form of respectability to this
system, which has helped stymie the emergence of a politics of
the national good while simultaneously undermining federalism
values.'
Moreover, when Congress legislates on matters of local concern, it
requires the federal courts to adjudicate the minutia of local problems.
As Professor BeVier has observed:
Boerne does more than assert judicial supremacy vis-A-vis
Congress on matters of constitutional interpretation. Its vital
federalism dimension also takes the federal courts out of the
resolution of close and important issues and places trust in the
overall decency and religiously-accommodating instincts of local
political institutions across the country.'
Finally, democracy is served by having local problems solved on the
local level. As Justice O'Connor has observed, "federalism enhances
the opportunity of all citizens to participate in representative
government. "' While dissatisfied persons have political redress through
85. REDISH, supra note 47, at 18.
86. Richard B. Stewart, Federalismand Rights, 19 GA. L. REv. 917,920 (1985).
87. Id. at 963.
88. Id.at 963-64.
89. Lillian R. BeVier, Religion in Congress and The Courts: Issues of Institutional
Competence, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 62, 65 (1998).
90. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,789 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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the electoral process when Congress has acted, political redress is
diluted when Congress makes a decision that should be made on the
local level. One person has a greater voice when the government unit is
smaller, and local governments are more accountable to their citizens.91
Moreover, state governments have a better perspective on problems
that have a unique impact at their level, and they have greater time to
devote to such matters. Thus, local governments are better able to
mediate between local interests than is the federal government.
11-.
LIITATIONS ON CONGRESS'S POWER TO PASS STATUTES

One of the major tenets of the new judicial activism is that
Congress's power to pass statutes is limited to its enumerated powers set
forth in the Constitution. The Supreme Court and lower courts have
invalidated statutes when Congress has exceeded its authority under
Article I's Commerce Clause or the Enforcement Clause (Section 5) of
the Fourteenth Amendment.9
A. Limitations on Congress'sPower under the Commerce Clause
Brzonkala held that Congress lacked the power to enact Subtitle C
of the Violence against Woman Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 ("VAWA")
under its commerce powers.'
Congress passed the VAWA "[i]n
response to the problems of domestic violence, sexual assault, and other
forms of violent crime against woman ...." Among its numerous
provisions, § 13981 (b) created a federal substantive right in "[a]ll
persons within the United States... to be free from crimes of violence
motivated by gender."'95 Section 13981 (c) provided a private right
against any "person... who commits a crime of violence motivated by
gender," which permitted an injured party to recover compensatory
damages, punitive damages, and injunctive, declaratory, and other
appropriate relief.9
The plaintiff, Christy Brzonkala, brought the action against two
football players at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, claiming that they had
91. See SHAPIRO, supranote 80, at 91-92.
92. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549; Brzonkala,169 F.3d at 820.
93. 169 F.3d at 826. The court also rejected appellant's contention that Congress had the
power to pass the statute under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. I will discuss
Congress's power to pass legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in the

next subsection.
94. Id. at 827.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1995).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1995).
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raped her.' The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that the complaint failed to state a claim under § 13981 and that
Congress lacked the authority to pass that section. The trial court
dismissed the case on the second ground.
The Fourth Circuit began its opinion by articulating its philosophy:
We the People, distrustful of power, and believing that
government limited and dispersed protects freedom best,
provided that our federal government would be one of
enumerated powers, and that all power unenumerated would be
reserved to the several States and to ourselves. Thus, though the
authority conferred upon the federal government be broad, it is
an authority constrained by no less a power than that of the
People themselves. "[T]hat these limits may not be mistaken, or
forgotten, the constitution is written." These simple truths of
power bestowed and power withheld under the Constitution
have never been more relevant than in this day, when accretion,
if not actual accession, of power to the federal government seems
not only unavoidable, but even expedient."
After having decided that the facts were sufficient to satisfy § 13981
for the purpose of a motion to dismiss, the court considered whether
Congress had the power to enact § 13981 under the Commerce Clause."
The court first established the extent of Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause as set forth in Lopez. The court declared that
[i]n demarcating the limits of congressional power to regulate
activities that do not themselves constitute interstate commerce,
the Court in Lopez made clear that such power does not extend
to the regulation of activities that merely have some relationship
with or effect upon interstate commerce, but, rather, extends
only, as is relevant here, to those activities "having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce,... [that is], those activities that

substantially affect interstate commerce."1°°

Two types of laws can satisfy Lopez's substantially affects
requirement: (1) "'regulations of activities that arise out of or are
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the
97. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 827-28.
98. Id. at 825-26, (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176).
99. Brzonkala, 169
at 829-30.
100. Id. at 830-31 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
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aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce,"' and (2)
"regulations that include a jurisdictional element to ensure, 'through
case-by-case inquiry,' that each specific application of the regulation
involves activity that in fact affects interstate commerce. "0' In addition,
Lopez emphasized the difference between regulating commercial or
economic activities and regulating those activities that are of a
noncommercial nature." The court also thought that deciding whether
a statute "'substantially affects' interstate commerce" is a question for
courts, not Congress, to decide.' 3
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the statute did not substantially
affect interstate commerce because it regulated noncommercial
activity."° The court declared:
[t]he statute does not regulate the manufacture, transport, or sale
of goods, the provision of services, or any other sort of
commercial transaction. Rather, it regulates violent crime
motivated by gender animus. Not only is such conduct clearly
it is not even economic in any meaningful
not commercial,
5
sense.1
The court added, "[tihat section 13981 may, on occasion, reach
activity that arises in part from economic motives does not transform it
into a statute regulating economic activity."' The statute also lacked an
"express jurisdictional element" that might limit its reach and make it a
valid exercise of Congress's commerce power' 07 Consequently, the
court concluded that "[b]ecause section 13981 neither regulates an
economic activity nor includes a jurisdictional element, it cannot be
upheld on the authority of Lopez or any other Supreme Court holding
demarcating the outer limits of Congress' power under the substantially
affects test.""'
The court felt that declaring the statute constitutional would violate
federalism principles: "A contrary holding would violate the 'first
principles' of a Constitution that establishes a federal government of
101. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 831 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
102 See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 832.
103. Id. at 831.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id. at 834.

ld.
ld.
Id. at 836.
Id.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[83:435

enumerated powers .... " ' The court observed that "our federal
system of government exists not as a mere matter of legislative grace, as
the dissent (and ultimately appellants) would have, but rather as a
matter of constitutional design."110 Quoting Lopez, the court declared:
[T]he scope of the interstate commerce power, "must be
considered in the light of our dual system of government and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view
of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create
a completely centralized government." 111

The court thought that upholding the VAWA would allow Congress to
intrude on an area in which states historically have been sovereign,
remove all limits on federal authority, and convert Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce into a general federal police power."'
The appellants argued that the relationship between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce was documented by congressional
findings to which the court was obligated to defer."1 However, the court
asserted that its deference to a Congressional finding is not absolute and
that it must undertake its own independent evaluation. 4 The court
declared that, if it did otherwise, "the Supreme Court's definitive
invocation [in Lopez] of the first principles of federalism as limitations
on congressional power would have to be consigned to platitude, for
legislative formalities are at most a more procedural limit on
109. Id. at 837 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552).
110. Id. at 861.
111. Id. at 837 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRIB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937))).
112. See id. at 838-40. In his concurrence, Judge Niemeyer added that "the redress of
sexual assaults and rape is a police power that the States, including Virginia, have
traditionally exercised." Id. at 904 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
113. See id. at 844.
114. See id. at 845. One might wonder how this ruling affects the rational basis test for
the due process and equal protection clauses. However, there is a significant difference
between the commerce clause and the due process and equal protection clauses in that the
commerce clause involves the extent of Congress's power, while the other two clauses
concern how Congress exercises its power. This author believes that the Court should give
greater attention to whether Congress has the power to act than to how it exercises its
power-that is, once the Court determines that Congress has the power to act, it should
generally defer to Congress's judgement. Consequently, Brzonkala's ruling on this issue may
not have any effect on the rational basis test for the due process and equal protection clauses.
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congressional power."'' 5 The court concluded that, based on its
independent evaluation, the congressional findings did not establish that
§ 13981 substantially affected interstate commerce.116
The appellants also asserted that, since the statute regulated conduct
implicating civil rights-"an area of manifest federal concern"-the
statute did not offend first principles of federalism, despite its
noneconomic nature.' In rejecting this argument, the court pointed out
that, "Congress has never asserted a general authority, untethered to
any specific constitutional power, to enact such legislation.""" The court

thought that section 13981 was untethered to any enumerated power.
The court concluded:
At the end of the day, it is apparent that, for objectives
unquestionably laudable, Congress has sought, through its
powers to enforce the Constitution's prohibitions against state
deprivations of equal protection and to regulate commerce
among the several States, to direct private individuals in their
activities wholly local and noneconomic. It has sought to reach
conduct quintessentially within the exclusive purview of the
States through legislation that neither conditions the federal
intervention upon proof of misconduct imputable to a State or
upon a nexus to interstate commerce, nor is tailored so as to
address activity closely connected with constitutional failures of
the States or with interstate commerce. This Congress may not
do, even in pursuit of the most noble of causes, lest be ceded to
the Legislature a plenary power over every aspect of human
affairs-no matter how private, no matter how local, no matter
how remote from commerce.12
Judge Wilkinson noted in his concurrence:
[s]ome will doubtless be amazed that a federal court could find
section 13981 unconstitutional when every American of good will
abhors violence against women ....Still, the structural dictates
of dual sovereignty must not ebb and flow with the tides of

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.at 848.
See id.at 849.
Id: at 844.
Id.at 852.
See id.
Id. at 889.

9
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popular support.'2'
Judge Wilkinson also asserted that the statute invaded "the last redoubt
of state government-the regulation of domestic relations."1"
Judge Wilkinson defended the decision's "activism" on the ground
that it lacked the discrediting features of the two previous periods of
judicial activism. 3 First, the decision involves different subject matter
than other cases that have applied similar principles, such as Lopez and
Printz, and, thus, it cannot be considered part of "any substantive
judicial agenda."' 24 Second, it "vindicates the structural values of
government by reaffirming the concept of enumerated powers," and it
reaffirms the judicial role "in maintaining the structural balance.""
Finally, "it vindicates the textual values of the Constitution by refusing
to assign a meaning to 'commerce' that is nowhere comprehended by
the term. 126
Judge Wilkinson accused the dissent of trying to rewrite the
2 7 He asserted,
Constitution to suit its own taste."
"[u]nder this view, two
pillars of our government will crumble: The courts would have almost
no role in structural disputes and the states would play no more than a
bit part in our federal system." 28
Judge Wilkinson also argued that the new judicial activism, as
applied in this case, would not cause statutes to "topple like falling
dominoes., 129 He advocated that "the values of federalism must be
tempered by the maxims of prudence and restraint," and he noted that
the courts have not taken Lopez too far.'3 He observed that "[i]f
modem activism accelerates to a gallop, then this era will go the way of
121.
122
123.
124.

Id. at 896 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
Id.
See id. at 897.
Id.

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. Judge Easterbrook has similarly stated: "Only when Congress oversteps the
formal limits on its power, as in Lopez and City of Boerne and the line-item veto case, does a
court intervene and even then only to require observance to forms, not to prescribe the
distribution or use of governmental power." Easterbrook, supra note 55, at 18. Likewise,
Professor Redish has noted, "[t]he Constitution's text and structure leave sufficient room for
the courts to take into account modern social and economic realities without requiring
abandonment of its directives." REDISH, supra note 47, at 165.
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its discredited forebear." 31
In her dissent in Brzonkala, Judge Motz criticized the majority for
ignoring fundamentals of democracy:
Even more disturbingly, the majority's ruling undermines the
fundamental principle of the government under which the
federal courts were created: that the people, through the
mechanisms and within the limits described in the Constitution,
have the ultimate authority to determine how they are to be
governed. The majority today does not act to protect the rights
of people underrepresented by the mechanisms of government.
Rather, the majority seeks, in the name of "the People," to
defend the states. Both the states and the people, however, are
represented in the federal legislative process. Moreover, they
are represented through mechanisms that, both practically and
constitutionally, are far better designed than is the judiciary to
protect their interests in preventing an improper distribution of
power between the national government and the states."
This author agrees with the majority and thinks that Judge Motz's
dissent is based on an incomplete view of our governmental structure.
Our government is not a pure democracy, but one in which democracy is
combined with checks and balances to limit the tyranny of those in
power. One of those checks and balances is that there are two
sovereigns, each with their own sphere of authority. In this case,
Congress invaded the state's authority. In striking down the VAWA,
the Court did not interfere with democracy; rather, it allocated authority
pursuant to the Constitution to the appropriate democratic body-the
states. Moreover, the Court performed its proper judicial roleenforcing the Constitution's structural provisions.
The legal basis of this case is simple. Congress overstepped its
powers under the Commerce Clause in passing the VAWA. Nothing
the Act regulated had any significant effect on commerce. While
131. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 897.
132. Id.at 933 (Motz, J., dissenting). Professor Choper has similarly argued that judicial
protection of federalism is not needed because states can protect themselves through the
political process. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 175-84 (1980); see also Larry D. Kramer, But When Exactly Was Judicially Enforced
Federalism "Born" in the First Place, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 123 (1998); Herbert
Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). For a while, the
Supreme Court adopted Choper's position. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528,551 n.11 (1985).
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violence against women may be a serious national problem, this fact did
not give Congress the authority to enact the VAWA because Congress
has limited powers. Since Congress lacked the authority to pass the Act,
this area of law falls under state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment."'
There is no way to legitimately interpret the Commerce Clause to
apply to the VAWA. To extend the Act to this statute would give
Congress the authority to regulate in almost any area, which would
destroy the delicate balance between federal and state sovereignty. Nor,
does the Necessary and Proper Clause expand the Commerce Clause to
give Congress authority to pass the statute. As Professor Amar has
pointed out, the Necessary and Proper Clause is one of the
Constitution's redundant/clarifying clauses-the clause was "designed to
remove all doubts.""4Professor Amar has declared:
The words of the clause of course do not purport to be an
independent, stand-alone grant of power. Rather, they are
explicitly tied to "the foregoing Powers" enumerated earlier in
Article I, Section 8. Nor is it so clear that the words of the clause
add anything at all to the scope of the earlier enumerations. If
we think of each of the earlier enumerations as an island of
explicit textual power ringed by some suitably-defined territorial
sea of implicit ancillary power, we need not read the words of the
Necessary and Proper Clause as widening the width of the
appropriate territorial sea. 35
If Congress has powers as broad under the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause as some scholars have stated, one must
wonder why the Framers bothered to list Congress's enumerated powers
in Article I.
The fact that some might believe that this Act is needed is not
enough to give Congress the power to enact the statute. As Judge
Easterbrook has observed, "[t]he Constitution is form; an appeal to
'function' is a claim that something else would be better than the
Constitution, which may be true but nevertheless isn't an admissible

133. The full text of the Tenth Amendment appears infra note 168 and accompanying
text.
134. Akhil Reed Amar, ConstitutionalRedundanciesand Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U.
L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1998).
135. Id. at 7.
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argument about interpretation of the structure we have."'M If the
Constitution is not working, the way to fix it is not to ignore it. The only
proper way to change the Constitution is to amend it under the
amendment procedure of Article W
V. ' Any other method is illegitimate.
As Justice Scalia has stated, the democratic "system is destroyed if the
smug assurances of each age are removed from the democratic processes
and written into the Constitution. "'
That Congress found that the statute regulated interstate commerce
is irrelevant. If Congress can declare its actions constitutional, the
separation of powers is destroyed.1 39 The Constitution is not a sham.
The fact that the court struck down the VAWA does not mean that
the proper sovereign-the states-cannot enact similar provisions. As
stated above, the regulation of crime is traditionally a state concern. All
states have extensive laws that protect women against crime and
violence. If these laws are inadequate in a particular state, that state can
enact additional laws. This determination is best made by the states
themselves, rather than a body that is far away from the local problem
and that is subject to national lobbyists that may not be concerned about
a particular state's problems.1" In addition, as stated above, the states
should have the power to experiment in local matters.
Brzonkala is not a case in which the Court exceeded its judicial role.
It did not strike down the statute because it disagreed with the statute's
wisdom. Rather, it invalidated the Act because it violated the
Constitution's structural limitations. That some may feel strongly about
the VAWA's importance does not make the Court's decision
substantive.""
The case on which the Fourth Circuit based its reasoning-Lopezpresents another instance in which Congress exceeded its Commerce
136. Easterbrook, supra note 55, at 15.

137. U.S. CONST. art. V.
138. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566-603 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Concerning this type of argument, Professor Redish has stated, "the Court's
abdication of review of federalism issues unjustifiably ignores textual language-in this case,
by turning it into a guide for Congress's conscience rather than construing it as an
enforceable, countermajoritarian constraint on federal power." REDISH, supranote 47, at 24.
140. Professor Marshall has observed that lobbyists prefer to work on the national level
because transaction costs are lower. See William Marshall, American PoliticalCulture and the
Failuresof ProcessFederalism,22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139,146 (1998).
141. Those who take cynical views of the new federalism include Rosalie Berger
Levinson, First Monday-The Dark Side of Federalism in the Nineties: Restricting Rights of
Religious Minorities,33 VAL. U. L. REV. 47,50 (1998); Norman Redlich and David R. Lurie,
Federalism:A Surrogatefor What Really Matters,23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1273 (1997).
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Clause powers.142 In that case, a twelfth-grade student was convicted of
possessing a firearm in a school zone in violation of the Gun-Free Zone
Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), which prohibited any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone. The Court overturned the
conviction on the ground that Congress
lacked the power to pass the
143
statute under the Commerce Clause.
While violence at schools, like violence against women, may be a
national problem, it is not an interstate commerce problem. Violence at
schools does not affect interstate commerce. That Congress sees a
problem that it thinks requires federal regulation is not enough to give
Congress the power to regulate in that area. Because Congress's powers
are limited, it needs a specific constitutional provision to enact a law,
and that constitutional provision cannot be stretched beyond its
reasonable meaning to give Congress authority it was never intended to
have.
While this article was in production, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari for Brzonkala, and one of the questions the Court will
consider is whether Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause in passing the Act.1" Because this article is using the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Brzonkala as an illustration of the new
judicial activism rather than as an indication of the state of the law, the
Supreme Court's decision will not affect this article's conclusions.
However, this author thinks that the Supreme Court will affirm the
Fourth Circuit's holding on this issue for the reasons given above.'45 In
particular, as noted above, violence based on gender animus does not
have a significant effect on interstate commerce.1 6 Moreover, the
Fourth Circuit's opinion closely tracks Lopez,147 and the Court is
unlikely to overrule this recent decision, especially considering that the
148
Court has gone even further in protecting states' rights since Lopez.
Specifically, as detailed in Part V, in recent years, the Court has not only
enforced the structural provisions of federalism contained in the
Constitution, such as not allowing Congress to exceed its powers under
the Commerce Clause, it has developed a broader conception of
142. 514 U.S. at 549.

143. See id.
144. See supra note 2.
145. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.

146. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
148. See infra Part V.
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federalism based on the spirit expressed by the Constitution's federalism
clauses.14 If the Court retains this broad conception of federalism, and
there is no reason to assume it will not considering that it strongly
asserted this conception in three cases in June 1999,1" it should hold the
VAWA unconstitutional.
B. Limitations on Congress's Power under the Enforcement Clause of the
FourteenthAmendment

Boerne held that Congress lacked the authority to pass the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Enforcement Clause (Section 5)."'

Congress enacted

RFRA in reaction to a Supreme Court decision that had rejected a free
exercise claim under the First Amendment brought by members of the
Native American Church who had been denied unemployment benefits
when they were fired because they had used peyote (an illegal drug) for
sacramental purposes."
RFRA provided:
Free exercise of religion protected
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.5
In Boerne, a Texas church wanted to enlarge its building, which
149. For this author's criticism of the Court's extension of federalism beyond the explicit
text of the Constitution, see Part V infra.
150. See infra note 237.
151. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536; see also Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1528 (1999)
"Congress has no affirmative power to authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment and is implicitly prohibited from passing legislation that purports to validate any
such violation." Id. at 1529.
152. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[83:435

replicated the "mission" style of the area's early history."M The Boerne
city council had passed an ordinance authorizing its Historic Landmarks
Commission to prepare a preservation plan regarding historic landmarks
and districts, and which required the Commission to pre-approve any
alterations to historic buildings in the district. City officials denied the
church's application for a building permit, and the church challenged
this denial on several grounds, including RFRA.
Justice Kennedy declared that RFRA was unconstitutional because
Congress lacked the authority to pass it.'55 In enacting RFRA, Congress
had employed the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which states that "[t]he Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.""6 Justice Kennedy
asserted that "[u]nder our Constitution, the Federal Government is one
of enumerated powers."', He declared that Congress's powers under
the clause were remedial, not plenary.1 8 He observed that "[1]egislation
which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to
be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional
right by changing what the right is."159 He added, "[i]f Congress could
define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means.""0 Thus, "[s]hifting legislative
majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent
the
61
difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V."1
Justice Kennedy concluded:
Regardless of the state of the legislative record, RFRA cannot be
considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to
have any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed
remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.
154. 521 U.S. at 512. RFRA is applicable to all levels of government. See also
2000b(3)(a).
155. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
156. Id. at 517.
157. Id. at 516 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,405(1819)).
158. See id at 522.
159. Id at 519; see also Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1529 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v.

Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1982) (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651
(1966))). ("'Congress's power under § 5 ... grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or
dilute these guarantees.'")
160. Boerne,521 U.S. at 529.
161. Id.
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It appears, instead, to 12attempt a substantive change in
constitutional protections.
This author agrees with the Court's decision in Boeme.6 In passing
RFRA, Congress overstepped its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. RFRA did not enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment; rather, it redefined the meaning of the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause to overrule an unpopular Supreme Court decision.
It is for the Supreme Court, not Congress, to decide the meaning of
When Congress dislikes the Court's
constitutional provisions.
interpretation of a statute that Congress has passed, Congress can
amend the statute to make its meaning clearer because it has the power
to enact statutes. However, when it dislikes the Court's interpretation
of a constitutional provision, all Congress can do is start the difficult
amendment process. Right or wrong, the Court is the Constitution's
final arbiter.
The Court's decision in Boerne respected the structural lines of
federalism-it allowed the proper sovereign to make the decision. Land
use and historic preservation are traditionally local concerns. The
federal government should not intrude into these areas, absent a clear
constitutional violation. A local government should be able to decide
how to preserve buildings in its historic districts, as long as that
government does not single out religion or a particular religious group.
Although the church in Boerne could not enlarge its building, it was not
treated differently than any other entity that is affected by local land use
laws.1
If the church was displeased with the decision, they had political
162. Id.
at 532.
163. For opposing opinions, see Chemerinsky, RFRA, supra note 26, at 601; Douglas
Laycock, ConceptualGulfs in City ofBoerne v. Flores,39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (1998).
164. "[W]hen the exercise of religion has been burdened in an incidental way by a law of
general application, it does not follow that the persons affected have been burdened any more
than other citizens, let alone burdened because of their religious beliefs." Boerne, 521 U.S. at
535.
Not all scholars agree with this contention, however. For example, Professor Laycock
has argued, "[ilt is often said that local government is closer to the people and thus more
politically responsive ....But it is rarely true for minority religions or small religious
organizations." Douglas Laycock, Federalismas a StructuralThreat to Liberty," 22 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 67, 81 (1998); see also Levinson, supra note 141, at 58-59. However, it should
be noted that the church still was protected by the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause if
the city had gone too far. That Congress's view of religious liberty is different than the
Court's is not a justification to restrict state sovereignty. The Supreme Court is the final
arbiter of the First Amendment.
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redress. They could have organized their members to petition the local
government, or they could have made the denial an issue in the next
election. In contrast, if the decision had gone the other way, the local
government would have lost control of land use and historic
preservation. We should not create enclaves that are immune from state
regulation. As Professor Sager declared, if such enclaves are allowed to
exist, "liberty... is selectively distributed-the religious soup kitchen,
the religious landlord, the religious artists, and the religious parent all
have rights
to defy legal rules that their secular equivalents must
65
obey."1
In sum, this author believes that the courts acted properly in striking
down the statutes in Brzonkala, Lopez, and Boerne on the ground that
Congress lacked the power to enact the statues involved in those
decisions. The contrasting subject matter in those cases-an act to
protect women against violence, a gun control law, and a statute
extending protection to religion beyond that mandated by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the First Amendment-demonstrates that the
courts are not acting substantively. Instead, they are performing its
proper constitutional role by enforcing the Constitution's structural
lines. They are allocating authority to the proper sovereign.
IV. CONGRESS'S POWER TO COERCE STATE LEGISLATURES TO
ENACT STATUTES OR TO REQUIRE STATE OFFICIALS TO ENFORCE
FEDERAL SCHEMES

The second area in which the Court has invalidated federal statutes
is when Congress has coerced legislatures to enact statutes or required
local officials to enforce federal schemes. This author believes that,
while Congress has sometimes exceeded its power in this area, the Court
has used the wrong principles to make this determination.
In New York, the Court invalidated Congress's attempt to force New
York and other states to pass legislation concerning the disposal of
radioactive waste.'6 Although Congress had passed an earlier statute to
deal with the problem, by 1985, it was obvious that this statute was not
working. Thus, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985. The Act dealt with the problem of
radioactive waste in three ways: (1) with monetary incentives, (2) with
access incentives, and (3) with a take-title provision, which was the main
165. Lawrence G. Sager, Congress as Partner/Congressas Adversary, 22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 86, 88 (1998); see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring).
166. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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part of the Act New York challenged. This provision provided:
If... a State in which low-level radioactive waste is generated is

unable to provide for disposal of all such waste generated within
such State ....[B]y January 1, 1996, each State in which such
waste is generated, upon the request of the generator or owner of
the waste, shall take title to the waste, be obligated to take
possession of the waste, and shall be liable for all damages
directly or indirectly incurred by such generator or owner as a
consequence of the failure of the State to take possession of the
waste as soon after January 1, 1996, as the generator or owner
notifies the State that the waste is available for shipment.1 67
New York and two counties filed a declaratory judgment action,
claiming that the Act violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments,
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Guarantee
Clause of Article V. The district court dismissed the complaint. The
petitioners only asserted the Tenth Amendment and Guarantee Clause
arguments before the Supreme Court.
The Court declared:
[w]hile no one disputes the proposition that "[t]he Constitution
created a Federal Government of limited powers," and while the
Tenth Amendment makes explicit that "the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people"; the task of ascertaining the
constitutional line between federal and state power has given rise
to many of the Court's most difficult and celebrated cases."
The Court thought that if the Constitution delegated a power to
Congress, "the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaime[d] any
reservation of that power to the States. While if a power was reserved
to the states by the Tenth Amendment, it was a power that the
16 Thus, the Court must
Constitution had not bestowed upon Congress.""
determine whether Article I conferred a power upon Congress, or
whether the Tenth Amendment placed a limitation on Congress's

167. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1995).
168. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 155 (citations omitted).
169. See id. at 156.
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authority.170 In making this determination, the key is "'not what power
the Federal Government ought to have but what powers in fact have
been given by the people."' The Court also thought that, although the
scope of the federal government's power over the states had changed
over time, the constitutional lines governing this relationship had
remained the same. 7 2
In challenging the Act's constitutionally, the petitioners did not
argue that "Congress lack[ed] the power to regulate the disposal of lowlevel radioactive waste." 7 3 Rather, they contended that Congress could
not regulate
in the way it did--directing the states to regulate in this
17 4
area.
The Court agreed that "Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce a federal regulatory program.'""' The people, through the
Constitution, created a national government that acted directly on its
citizens, in place of a limited confederate government that acted only
upon the states. 76 Accordingly, under the Commerce Clause, Congress
can regulate interstate commerce directly, but it cannot "regulate state
governments' regulation of interstate commerce."'
Moreover, when
Congress acts in this way, it diminishes the accountability of both state
and federal officials. As the Court pointed out, "where the Federal
Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who
will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who
devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision."' 78
While the Court believed that the first two incentives under the Act
did not cross the constitutional line, the Court thought that the take-title
provision did. 179 This provision gave states "a 'choice' of either
accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the instructions
of Congress.""' Congress could not constitutionally require a state to
170. See id. at 157.
171. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936)).
172. See id. at 159.
174. Id.
174. See id. at 159-60.
175. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodell v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.,
452 U.S. 264,288 (1981)).
176. See id. at 162.
177. Id. at 166.
178. Id. at 169.
179. See id. at 174-77.
180. Id. at 175.

1999]

THE NEW JUDICIALACTIVISM

take title to the waste, nor could it make that state liable for the
generators' damages."' Similarly, Congress cannot command the states
to pass a regulatory scheme.'8 Consequently, Congress could not force
a state to make a choice between the two.18

The Court spent little time on the Guarantee Clause argument. It
declared:
Because we have found that the take title provision of the Act
[is] irreconcilable with the powers delegated to Congress by the
Constitution and hence with the Tenth Amendment's reservation
to the States of those powers not delegated to the Federal
Government, we need only address the applicability of the
Guarantee Clause to the Act's other two challenged provisions.""
The Court then held that these provisions did not violate the Guarantee
Clause, stating "neither the monetary incentives provided by the Act
nor the possibility that a State's waste producers may find themselves
excluded from the disposal sites of another State can reasonably be said
to deny any State a republican form of government."""
The Court's reasoning in New York was inconsistent. The Court
declared that, if a power was given to Congress, it was not given to the
states under the Tenth Amendment.86 Yet, the commerce power was
given to Congress. How, then, can the Tenth Amendment limit
Congress's power to pass the challenged provision? In other words, if
Congress has the power to pass the provision, then there are no limits on
this power unless the Court can find another Constitutional provision
that forbids Congress from exercising its powers in the way it did.
In making its decision, the Court looked to its general conception of
federalism, rather than employing a specific constitutional provision."
This author agrees with the Court's notion that forcing a state to pass
legislation upsets the balance inherent in the first principle of
181. See U
182 See id.
at 175-76.
183. See id.
at 176.
184. lId at 183-84.
185. Id.
at 185.
186. See id
187. Justice O'Connor declared: "The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power
of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which,
as we have discussed, is essentially a tautology. Instead... [t]he Tenth Amendment thus
directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected
by a limitation on an Article I power." Id.at 156-57.
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federalism. Such a power strips the state of its sovereignty and increases
Congress's power beyond what the framers seem to have intended. This
author also agrees that the Constitution was intended to apply to the
people and not use the states as intermediaries. However, grounding
New York in the general concept of federalism is making the same
mistake that liberal judges have often been accused of making-failing
to cite to a specific constitutional provision on which the decision is
properly based.1
Such a provision exists in the Constitution's Guarantee Clause,
which requires the United States to "guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government ....

""'

"[A] republican

government is 'one in which the people control their rulers.., through
majoritarian processes.' " As the Supreme Court has stated, "the
distinguishing feature [of a republican form of government] is the right
of the people to choose their own officers for governmental
administration, and pass their own laws...."191 Stated similarly, in a
republic "the power to enact laws and control public servants lies with
the great body of the people."'9 The Guarantee Clause both precludes
a state from adopting a nonrepublican form of government and
prohibits the federal government from interfering with the republican
basis of a state government." As Professor Merritt has noted, "both
advocates and foes of the new constitution recognized the guarantee
clause as an attempt to mark the boundary between federal power and
state sovereignty."

14

188. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1968).
189. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Professor Tribe has declared that "[i]f courts are once
again to take up the task of preserving for states their constitutionally essential role as selfgoverning polities, the guarant clause [sic] might well provide the most felicitous textual home
for that enterprise." TRIBE, supra note 46, at 398. Similarly, Professor Merritt has suggested
that the guarantee clause places "a modest restraint on federal power to interfere with state
autonomy." Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
For a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) [hereinafter Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause]. She later declared, "[tihe clause allows Congress full scope to address national
problems, while defending only the attributes of state government necessary to preserve
independent functioning governments in the states." Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican
Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 815, 832 (1994) [hereinafter, Merritt, Republican Governments]. For an opposing view,
see Robert F. Nagel, Terminator2, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 843 (1994).
190. Merritt, The GuaranteeClause,supra note 189, at 23.
191. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891); see also VanSickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d
223, 243 (Kan. 1973).
192. 16B AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 636 (1998).
193. See Merritt, The GuaranteeClause,supra note 189, at 25.
194. Id. at 35.
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The Court, however, has rarely used this clause. For the most part,
the Court has thought that questiofis under the clause were
nonjusticable political questions.195 Although one case suggested that
not all claims under this clause are nonjusticable,'9 the Court has failed
to put any substance into the clause. However, the Court's failure to
give any substance to this clause violates the notion of the new judicial
activism that one clause of the Constitution should not be given a great
deal of meaning and another clause none." If the Supreme Court
cannot decide whether the Guarantee Clause has been violated, what
branch of government will?
I believe that the Court could have relied on the Guarantee Clause
in New York to hold the take-title provision unconstitutional."98 If a
sovereign can force another sovereign's legislature to enact a regulatory
scheme, the other sovereign lacks a republican form of government. In
a republican form of government, the people elect a legislature that
enacts laws."9 Any significant interference with this structure destroys
the republican nature of that government, as occurred in New York.
Printz suffers from the same problem as New York; the Court mainly
based its decision on the wrong principles.2 In Printz, the Court held
that Congress could not impose duties on local officials. Under the
interim provisions of the Brady Act (a gun control statute), if a state
lacked certain alternatives concerning background checks before the
purchase of a handgun, the chief law enforcement officer of the
transferee's residence ("CLEO") (such as sheriffs) must "make a
reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or
195. See New York, 505 U.S. at 184.
196. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,582 (1964).
197. I will discuss the new judicial activism's notion that the Court should not be
textually selective in its constitutional interpretation in depth in Part VI infra. Professor
Chemerinsky has noted that the Guarantee Clause "is the only instance in which
nonjusticability has the effect of rendering a constitutional provision a nullity." Erwin
Chemerinsky, Cases underthe GuaranteeClause Should Be Justicable," 65 U. COLO. L. REv.
849, 851 (1994). Professor Merritt has asserted, "neither Supreme Court precedents holding
the guarantee clause nonjusticable nor deference to the political process bars judicial review
of claims that Congress has offended the guarantee clause by invading state autonomy. A
proper understanding of the Supreme Court's guarantee clause decisions, together with a
careful application of the criteria in Baker v. Carr,demonstrates that such claims are fully
enforceable in the courts." Merritt, Guarantee Clause,supra note 189, at 78 (citing Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
198. Professor Merritt has come to the same conclusion. Merritt, A New Role, supra
note 189, at 818-19 ("[Ihe unconstitutional provision in New York violated the core notion
of state sovereignty protected by the Guarantee Clause." Id. at 826).
199. See supra notes 189- 92 and accompanying text.
200. Printz, 521 U.S. at 898.
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possession would be in violation of the law, including research in
whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a
national system designated by the Attorney General." 201 Two CLEOs
challenged the Act's constitutionality as it applied to them. Two district
courts concluded that the challenged portion of the Act was
unconstitutional but that the unconstitutional portions were severable.
The Ninth Circuit reversed.
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the portion of
the Brady Act that placed duties on local officers violated the
"constitutional system of dual sovereignty."m Justice Scalia analyzed
the controversy from three perspectives: (1) "historical understanding
and practice," (2) the Constitution's structure, and (3) the Court's
jurisprudence.'

Justice

Scalia

thought

that

the

"historical

understanding and practice," although not conclusive, suggested that the
4
federal government could not place duties on state and local officersY
Justice Scalia argued that federalism considerations made the
provision unconstitutional. 25 He thought that the Constitution gave
Congress the power to regulate individuals rather than states. 6 He
declared that "[t]he power of the Federal Government would be
augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service-and
at no cost to itself-the police officers of the 50 States."' He also felt
that the provision upset the separation of powers on the federal levellocal officials were undertaking duties that should have been performed
by the executive branch of the federal government.' He declared:
The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Federal
Executive-to assure both vigor and accountability-is wellknown .... That unity would be shattered, and the power of the
President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as
effectively without the President as with him, by simply requiring
state officers to execute its laws.0

201. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1999).
202 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.

203. See id. at 905.
204. Id. at 905-19.
205. See id. at 917-25.
206. See id. at 919-20.
207. Id. at 922.
208. See id. at 922-23. For a competing view, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in
ConstitutionalContext, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 181 (1998).
209. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922-23 (citations omitted).
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Justice Scalia rejected the dissent's argument that Congress's
exercise of power was valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause."'0
He asserted that
[w]hen a "La[w] ...for carrying into Execution" the Commerce

Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the
various constitutional provisions we mentioned earlier, it is not a
"La[w] ...proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce

Clause," and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, "merely [an]
ac[t] of usurpation" which "deserve[s] to be treated as such.'
Thus, "'[e]ven where Congress has the authority under the Constitution
to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power
directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts ....212
Finally, Justice Scalia examined the Court's prior jurisprudence,
finding that "we sustained statutes against constitutional challenge only
after assuring ourselves that they did not require the States to enforce
federal law."'2 3 He also rejected the government's contention that New
York was distinguishable. 214 Although the government argued that the
background check provisions did not require local officials to make
policy decisions, Justice Scalia concluded that "[e]xecutive action that
has utterly no policymaking component is rare .... 215 Even assuming
the government's argument was true, Justice Scalia thought that the
provision interfered with state sovereignty:
It is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that
they remain independent and autonomous within their proper
sphere of authority. It is no more compatible with this
independence and autonomy that their officers be
"dragooned" ... into administering federal law, than it would be

compatible with the independence and autonomy of the United
States that its officers be impressed into service for the execution
of state laws.2 6

210.
211.
212.
213.

See id.at 923.
Id. at 923-24.
d. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 166).
Printz, 521 U.S. at 925.

214. See id. at 926-31.
215. I1&at 927.

216. Id. at 928 (citations omitted).
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Justice Scalia also disagreed with the government's contention that
requiring state officials to perform ministerial duties under the provision
did not diminish the accountability of state or federal officials, as was
forbidden by New York.21 ' He declared:
[u]nder the present law,... it will be the CLEO and not some
federal official who stands between the gun purchaser and
immediate possession of his gun. And it will likely be the CLEO,
not some federal official, who will be blamed for any error...
that causes a purchaser to be mistakingly rejected."8
Justice Scalia also rejected the dissent's attempt to distinguish New
York on the ground that the provision was directed at individuals, not
states, because it was directed to individuals in their official capacities as
state officers." 9 He also dismissed the government's arguments that the
Act served important purposes, that it was most efficiently administered
by CLEOs, and that it imposed only a temporary and minimal burden
on state officials on the ground that balancing is not proper when the
structural framework of dual sovereignty is involved.'
I agree with Justice Scalia that using local officials to perform federal
duties violates the notion of dual sovereignty in federalism. However, I
reject the justifications in his opinion (except for the one concerning the
separation of powers), on the same grounds I rejected the reasoning in
New York." A general notion of federalism is not enough to base a
constitutional violation on, and the other bases of Justice Scalia's
decision-history and the Court's jurisprudence-only reinforce this
ground.
If the statute had involved state, rather than local, officials, I would
again have based the outcome on the Guarantee Clause. An official of a
republican government is not subject to another sovereign's authority.
A state legislature could require a state official to perform such duties,
but, when Congress does so, it interferes with the Guarantee Clause.
However, only local officials were involved in this case, and the
217. See id. at 929-31.
218. Id. at 930.
219. Id. at 930-31.
220. See id. at 931-33.
221. Other scholars who have criticized the reasoning of Justice Scalia's opinion include:
Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT.
REV. 199 (1997); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "DualSovereignty" Doesn't,96 MIcH L. REV. 813, 824
(1998).
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Guarantee Clause protects only state governments.'
I do agree with Justice Scalia that the outcome is mandated by the
separation of powers set forth in the Constitution. When Congress gave
local officials, rather than the federal executive, the duty to enforce the
statute, it violated Article II, which states: "The executive Power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America."'
In sum, when Congress passes a law under its enumerated powers, it
has full authority in determining the content of the law and how the law
is to be carried out, unless the law contravenes a specific constitutional
provision. An opinion that the law contravenes a general conception of
federalism is not enough to invalidate a law; the Court must point to a
specific constitutional provision that has been violated. In the case of
New York, such a provision existed in the guarantee clause. 224 In Printz,
the outcome was firmly grounded in the separation of powers under
Article II.
V. CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The first question concerning congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity is whether Congress can abolish a state's Eleventh
Amendment right not to be sued in federal court. Seminole Tribe of
Floridav. Floridaplaced strong limits on Congress's ability to do so.'
Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which provided
that an Indian tribe may conduct certain gaming activities, such as
casino gambling, only in compliance with a compact between the tribe
and the relevant state.m The Act required a state to negotiate in good
faith with the tribe to develop a compact, and it authorized the tribe to
file suit in federal court if a state breached that duty.m The Court held
the Indian Commerce Clause did not grant Congress the power to
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity against suits in
federal court and, thus, did not grant jurisdiction over a state that had
not consented to be sued in federal court.'
222. The Guarantee Clause does not apply to local governments. See Johnson v.
Genesee County, 232 F. Supp. 567,570 (E.D. Mich. 1964); State ex rel. Porterie v. Smith, 166
So. 72,82 (La. 1936)Y
223. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
224. As stated above, the same clause would have applied to Printz, if state, rather than
local, officials had been involved.
225. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
226. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
227. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (West Supp. 1999).
228. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
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The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 29
The Court asks two questions in evaluating whether Congress has
abrogated a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity: (1) has Congress
"'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity"' and
(2) has Congress "acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of that power.'M
The Court thought that Congress had unequivocally expressed its
intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the statute. 1
The main issue, therefore, was whether Congress had the power to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the statute.'
The key question in this inquiry was "[w]as the Act in question passed
pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to
abrogate?" 3 The Court had previously found only two constitutional
provisions that allowed such abrogation: (1) Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and (2) the Commerce Clause.' The Court thought that,
if Congress had the power to abrogate sovereign immunity under the
Commerce Clause, it had a similar power under the Indian Commerce
Clause.3 5
The Court, however, held that Congress did not have the power to
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Commerce
Clause, overruling the plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co.'- The Court felt that Union Gas had departed sharply from the
Court's federalism jurisprudence, declaring "[i]t was well established in
1989 when Union Gas was decided that the Eleventh Amendment stood
for the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity limited the
federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III." 37 The Court stated that
Union Gas's conclusion "that Congress could under Article I expand the
229. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
230. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (quoting Green V. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
231. See id. at 56-57.

232. See id. at 58.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 59.
See id.
See id. at 63.
Id. at 66 (overruling,Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
Seminole, 517 U.S. at 64.
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scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III-'contradict[s]
our unvarying approach to Article III as setting forth the exclusive
catalog of permissible federal-court jurisdiction. '" m The Court added
that "[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law
making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment
prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
unconsenting States." 9
While this author feels that allowing states immunity from suit in
federal court upsets the balance between the federal and state
governments, I agree with the Court's decision that Congress cannot
force a nonconsenting state to be sued in federal court. The language of
the Eleventh Amendment seems absolute. The only possible exception
is Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is a later amendment,
and in the proper context, it is necessary to allow Congress to abrogate a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity to give the Fourteenth
Amendment its full breadth. The same reasoning, however, does not
apply to Congress's Article I powers. There is no reason to think that
Article I carves out a broad exception to the Eleventh Amendment.
I do not believe that allowing a state to be sued in federal court
interferes with state sovereignty. As I discuss in more detail below, if
Congress has the power to enact a law, then the states lack sovereignty
in that area. Moreover, when a federal statute is enforced in state,
rather than federal court, the litigant faces the danger of local prejudice.
However, the Constitution has spoken, and one should not ignore the
Constitution's clear mandates on normative grounds.
In 1999, the Court severely limited Congress's ability to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in any court.2 In Alden, the most extensive of
the cases, the Court held that Congress could not provide for suits
against states under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA")."4'
Maine probation officers had filed suit against Maine, alleging that the
state had violated the FLSA's overtime provisions. 24 2 The Maine trial
court dismissed based on sovereign immunity, and the Maine Supreme
Court affirmed. The decision created doubt concerning FLSA's
provision authorizing original actions against states in their own courts
238. Id. at 65 (quoting Union Gas, U.S. 491 at 39).
239. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
240. See, Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); Florida Prepaid Post Secondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Post Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).

241. 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
242. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1998).
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without their consent.2 43
The Court held that "the powers delegated to Congress under
Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to
subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state
courts. "244 While the Eleventh Amendment explicitly refers to the
states' immunity from suits
"commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State ...the States" immunity from suit is a fundamental

aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today...
except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain
constitutional Amendments.245
Justice Kennedy declared:
Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as
sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment, which,
like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to
allay lingering concerns about the extent of national power. The
Amendment confirms the promise implicit in the original
document: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people. "24'
Justice Kennedy thought the states retained the "dignity and
essential attributes" of sovereignty and that the Framers considered
sovereign immunity central to sovereign dignity.247 Justice Kennedy
cited numerous examples in which the Framers and members of the
ratifying conventions assured doubters that Article III of the
Constitution would not permit suits against states in federal court.2" For
example, John Marshall declared, "'I hope no Gentleman will think that
a state will be called at the bar of the federal court ....
It is not rational

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2247; see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1998).
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
Id. at 2246-47 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI).
Id. at 2247 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
Id.
See id. at 2248-49.
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to suppose, that the sovereign power shall be dragged before a court."' 249
Justice Kennedy responded to the petitioner's argument that the
ratification debates centered on the states' immunity from suit in federal
court, rather than sovereign immunity in general, by declaring:
We believe, however, that the founders' silence is best explained
by the simple fact that no one, not even the Constitution's most
ardent opponents, suggested the document might strip the States
of the immunity. In light of the overriding concern regarding the
States' war-time debts, together with the well known creativity,
foresight, and vivid imagination of the Constitution's opponents,
the silence is most instructive. It suggests the sovereign's right to
assert immunity from suit in its own courts was a principle so well
established that no one conceived it would be altered by the new
Constitution.50
Despite these reassurances and the well-established principle, in
1793, the Court held that a private citizen of another state could sue
Georgia without its consent under Article III on the ground that the
case fell under Article II's literal language.25
The Eleventh
Amendment was quickly proposed and adopted thereafter.2 However,
Justice Kennedy felt that the Eleventh Amendment merely restored
Article III's original meaning.' In addition, "Congress chose not to
enact language codifying the traditional understanding of sovereign
immunity but rather to address the specific provisions of the
Constitution that had raised concerns during the ratification debates and
formed the basis of the Chisholm decision."' In other words,
[t]he more natural inference is that the Constitution was
understood, in light of its history and structure, to preserve the
States' traditional immunity from private suits.
As the
Amendment clarified the only provisions of the Constitution that
anyone had suggested might support a contrary understanding,
249. Id.at 2249 (quoting 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 555
(2d ed. 1854)).
250. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2260.
251. Chisholm v. Georgia, (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
252- See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2250.
253. See id.at 2250-51 ("[T]he majority [in Chisholm] failed to address either the
practice or the understanding that prevailed in the States at the time the Constitution was
adopted." Id.at 2250).
254. Id.
at 2251.
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there was no reason to draft with a broader brush.'5
In addition, Justice Kennedy thought that the Constitution would not
have been ratified if it had deprived the states of sovereign immunity.25

Justice Kennedy also argued that the Court's jurisprudence
confirmed that the Constitution did not strip the states of sovereign
immunity. 7 He declared that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment confirmed
rather than established sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle;
it follows that the scope of the States' immunity from suit is demarcated
not by the text of the Amendment alone but by the fundamental
postulates implicit in the constitutional design."2Accordingly, in determining whether Congress has the power to
abrogate a nonconsenting state's sovereign immunity under Article I,
the Court should not rely on the amendment alone because to do so
"would be to engage in the type of a historical literalism we have
rejected in interpreting the scope of States' sovereign immunity since
the discredited decision in Chisholm."5 9 Justice Kennedy concluded
that "[i]n exercising its Article I powers Congress may subject the States
to private suits in their own courts only if there is 'compelling evidence'
that the States were required to surrender this power to Congress

pursuant to the constitutional design."2
This author believes that Alden is a case in which the Court went too
far in protecting states' rights on ideological grounds and violated the
principles of the new judicial activism. 61 In other words, in Alden,
255. Id. at 2252.
256. See id. at 2253.
257. See id.at 2253-54.
25& Id. at 2254.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 2255 (citation omitted).
261. On the other hand, Professor Lessig has argued that "federalism requires.., the
Court to craft, to construct, to make-up, limits on regulative authority, both state and federal,
so as to check the growth in the commerce power, to the extent that growth has set the
original balance askew." Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez,
1995 SUP. Cr. REV. 125, 192 (1995); see also Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingFederalism's
Text, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1218 (1998). I disagree with Professor Lessig's approach
because it is unprincipled and ignores the limitations on the judge's role. As Professor Tribe
has noted, "[c]reating states' rights out of whole cloth in order to readdress a perceivable shift
in power to central government is an arrogation of authority as illegitimate as conjuring rights
of privacy or minimum income out of thin air or transforming the Constitution into a source
of inviolable protection for contract and property regardless of public need." TRIBE, supra
note 46, at 399. When courts allow substantive views to govern the outcome of constitutional
adjudication, there is the risk of having legitimate constitutional values suppressed when they
are held by a minority. If, on the other hand, the courts enforce the structural protections in
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"modem activism [has] accelerate[d] to a gallop." 262 Textualist judges,

who in other cases advocate strictly following the constitutional text, are
now ignoring that text, in favor of reading ambiguous historical practice

into the Constitution.
First, there is no specific passage in the Constitution that limits
Congress's powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Article I
except for the Eleventh Amendment, and the explicit text of the
Eleventh Amendment applies only to judicial power under Article III,

not to Article I.2 Moreover, it is questionable to rely on a general
understanding at the time of the Constitution's ratification to strike
down otherwise valid constitutional enactments. As Professor Redish
has declared, "[u]nless the Framers actually embodied their goal in the

Constitutional text, that goal has no constitutional status, because it has
not been subjected to the ratification process .... ,264
As for Justice Kennedy's reliance on the general notion of
federalism, it should be pointed out that other new judicial activism
opinions have rejected similar arguments, as in Brzonkala, where the
court required that Congress's power be anchored in the text, rather

than in some general power to enact civil rights legislation.2 5 Moreover,
these judges have rejected the use of "penumbra" of constitutional

provisions as the basis of constitutional rights,2 and Justice Kennedy's
general notion of federalism sounds suspiciously like "penumbra."
Likewise, these judges have rejected similar approaches to textual
interpretation. For example, in a case concerning statutory analysis,
the Constitution, all constitutional values will exist in moderation. For more detailed analyses
of Professor Lessig's thesis, see Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural
Approach, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1161 (1998); Gregory E. Maggs, Translating Federalism:
A Textualist Reaction, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1198 (1998); Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Third Translationof the Commerce Clause: CongressionalPowerto Regulate Social Problems,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206 (1998).
262. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820,898 (4th Cir. 1999).
263. For the text of the Eleventh Amendment, see supra note 229 and accompanying
text. Justice Scalia has pointed out that "[i]n textual interpretation, context is everything, and
the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and
phrases an expansive rather than narrow interpretation though not an interpretation that the
language will not bear." ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 37 (1997). While I agree with this proposition, I believe that the
Court has given the Eleventh Amendment "an interpretation that the language will not
bear." It stretches all reasonable methods of textual interpretation to derive a blanket right
of sovereign immunity from a text that only refers to immunity from suit in federal court.
264. REDISH, supranote 47, at 46.
265. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 852.
266. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 627, n.5 (1990); see also
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 568-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy wrote, "[t]he problem with spirits is that they tend to
reflect less the views of the world whence they come than the views of
' Or, as Justice Scalia has declared, "it
those who seek their advice." 267
is
simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed with fair
government, to have the meaning of the law determined by what the
lawmaker meant, rather than by what the lawmaker promulgated."M
Similarly, Justice Scalia has generally rejected the use of legislative
history in statutory analysis because he rejects legislative intent as a
proper criterion for textual analysis." 9 He has declared: "Government
by unexpressed intent is similarly tyrannical."2 0
Moreover, the judges that are relying on the Framer's silence as a
fundamental part of their decision in Alden have elsewhere clearly
rejected the use of silence in textual interpretation."2 The danger in the
above, as Justice Scalia has pointed out, is that
[w]hen you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the
legislature said, but on the basis of what it meant, and are assured
that there is no necessary connection between the two, your best
shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask yourself
what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; and that
will surely bring you to the conclusion that the law means what
you think it ought to mean-which is precisely how judges decide
things under the common law. 2 2
In other words, in Alden, the Court is "pil[ing] inference upon
inference," a technique of constitutional interpretation it vehemently
rejected in Lopez.2 3 For example, Justice Kennedy declared concerning
267. Public Citizen V. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
268. SCALIA, supra note 263, at 17; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the
Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1119, 1120 (1998) ("[T]he judicial branch serves best by
enforcing enacted words rather than unenacted (more likely, imagined) intents, purposes, and
wills.").
269. See SCALIA , supra note 263, at 29-30 ("What I look for in the Constitution is
precisely what I look for in a statute: The original meaning of the text, not what the original
draftsman intended." Id. at 38.).
270. Id. at 17.
271. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(statutory interpretation); see also Sedima S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.13 (1985)
("[C]ongressional silence, no matter how 'clanging' cannot override the words of the
statute.").
272. SCALIA, supra note 263, at 18.
273. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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the swift adoption of the Eleventh Amendment:
The more reasonable interpretation, of course, is that regardless
of the views of the four Justices in Chisholm, the country as a
whole-which had adopted the Constitution just five years
earlier-had not understood the document to strip the States of
their immunity from private suits.'
This author, however, believes that a later amendment to a text has
to the interpretation of the original text. First, it is the text
relevance
no
of the Constitution that is being interpreted, not ambiguous enactment
history. Second, the bodies that enacted the Eleventh Amendment were
not the same bodies that established the Constitution. Finally, the
"country" might simply have changed its mind. The same principle
against piling inference upon inference also applies to the framers'
silence mentioned above.
Looking at the constitutional text demonstrates that Congress had
the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity without interfering with
federalism. The Constitution gave Congress the power to pass the
FLSA under its Article I Commerce Clause powers. As the Court wrote
in Lopez, "'[t]his power, like all others vested in congress, is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations,

other

than

are

prescribed

in

the

constitution. '275

Consequently, the Constitution gave Congress, not the states, complete
sovereignty to regulate interstate commerce. In other words, in
regulating the states through the FSLA under its interstate commerce
powers, Congress is not interfering with the states' sovereign immunity
because they have no sovereignty in this area. The Tenth Amendment
does not change this because it merely confirms that powers not
expressly given to Congress are reserved to the states; it does not give
the states additional sovereignty2 6 Residuary sovereignty' n does not
274. Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2252.
275. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824)).
276. Justice Roberts declared, "[t]he Tenth Amendment was intended to confirm the
understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was adopted, that powers not
granted to the United States were reserved to the States or to the people." United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931). See also New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57; Amar, supra note
134, at 20-21; Yoo, JudicialSafeguards, supra note 55, at 1393; REDISH, supra note 47, at 43
("If a particular power has been given to the federal government, in Article I or elsewhere in
the Constitution, that power is tautologically not reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment.").
277. See e.g., Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2263.
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mean absolute sovereignty. In addition, one must wonder why the
Eleventh Amendment was necessary if the Tenth Amendment or other
constitutional provisions gave the states total immunity.
The Court's decision destroys the idea of accountability that is the
essence of the rule of law. A state would be above the law because it
could ignore the law of the legitimate sovereign that enacted that law.
A state, for example, could dump toxic waste anywhere it wanted
without liability. Or, as Professor Malloy has observed, the states might
be exempt from certain federal civil rights laws.2" Allowing states to
deal with its obligations in other ways is not enough. In the same way
that Congress should not be permitted to determine which of its
enactments is constitutional27 9 the states should not be allowed to decide
when they will comply with constitutional federal law.
The Court's holding also infringes upon the federal government's
sovereignty. Since the federal government is sovereign in the area of
interstate commerce, allowing the states "immunity" from that
sovereignty destroys the balance between federal and state sovereignty.
While the balance before the 1990s was too heavily in favor of the
federal government, the Court should not overreact and give the states
more sovereignty than the Constitution authorizes.
One might argue that applying federal law to the states can
overburden the states, thus, interfering with their sovereignty. In fact,
Justice Kennedy averred in Alden that
[n]ot only must a State defend or default but also it must face the
prospect of being thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into
the disfavored status of a debtor, subject to the power of private
citizens to levy on its treasury or perhaps even government
buildins or property which the State administers on the public's
behalf.f
However, this author sees nothing in the Constitution that requires
Congress to treat states any differently than individuals concerning the
laws it passes under its enumerated powers. As Justice Souter's dissent
pointed out,
278. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Whose Federalism?32 IND L. REv. 45,46 (1998).
Professor Malloy's critique would not be applicable to my version of the new judicial activism
because, if Congress has the power to enact a law, its sovereignty is absolute and it can apply
that law to the states (as long as it does not violate another constitutional provision).
279. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
280. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.
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[s]o long as the citizens' will, expressed through state legislation,
does not violate valid federal law, the strain will not be felt; and
to the extent that state action does violate federal law, the will of
the citizens' of the United States already trumps that of the
citizens of that State: the strain then is not only expected, but
necessarily intended."1
Some of the assumptions underlying the majority opinion are also
questionable. As stated above, the Court relied on several quotations
for the proposition that the Framers and the ratifying conventions
thought that the Constitution would not interfere with state sovereign
immunity.' However, with the possible exception of the Hamilton
quote, the quotations are referring to the possibility of the states being
sued in federal court, not a broader conception that states cannot be
sued at all. In addition, as Justice Souter observed in his dissent, the
universal conception of sovereign immunity that the majority painted in
Alden may not be accurate. Justice Souter declared:
Around the time of the Constitutional Convention, then, there
existed among the States some diversity of practice with respect
to sovereign immunity; but despite a tendency among the state
constitutions to announce and declare certain inalienable and
natural rights of men and even of the collective people of a
State... no State declared that sovereign immunity was one of
those rights.2
Thus, Justice Kennedy's statement that the Constitution would not have
been ratified if it stripped the states of their sovereign immunity has
questionable historical support.
More fundamentally, the usual notion of sovereign immunity does
not correspond to the manner the majority applied it in Alden. As
Justice Holmes has pointed out: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or absolute theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depend[ed]. "' In other
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Maat 2289 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2273-75.
Id. at 2274-75.
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (cited in, Alden, 119 S.Ct. at
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words, a sovereign is immune only from its laws, not those of another
sovereign.
The Supreme Court applied this principle in Nevada v. Hall, where
the Court held that California could sue Nevada in a California court."
Justice Kennedy tried to distinguish Hall on the ground that it did not
involve Congress's power to subject states to private suits nor a state's
immunity from suits in its own courts.' While this distinction is valid in
isolation, Nevada still demonstrates that state sovereign immunity is not
absolute.
Another problem with the argument that states cannot be sued in
their own courts is that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to
enforce federal law and state court judges to be bound by it.' An
independent sovereign does not have to open its courts to foreign claims
at all, and when it adjudicates foreign claims, it does so by comity, not
by any legal requirement.2 9 Thus, state courts lack this aspect of
absolute sovereignty. In addition, all the state court is doing is
performing its normal judicial function. As Justice Souter noted in his
dissent:
But this is to forget that the doctrine of separation of powers
prevails in our Republic. When the state judiciary enforces
federal law against state officials, as the Supremacy Clause
requires it to do, it is not turning against the State's executive any
more than we turn against the Federal Executive when we apply
federal law to the United States: [I]t is simply upholding the rule
of law.2'
The two related cases decided that same day as Alden illustrate
further the problems created by not allowing Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, especially considering that in these cases the state
146 (Souter, J., dissenting)).

286. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
287. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2259.
288. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
289. See, e.g., Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 821 F. Supp. 292, 299
n.7 (D.N.J. 1993); Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Inc., 462 N.W.2d
164, 167 (N.D. 1990); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei mbH v. Starcher,
328 S.E.2d 492,505 (W. Va. 1985).
290. Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2288-89 n.34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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was acting more like a private business than a government.2 9' In Florida
Prepaid, the Court held that Congress could not abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity under the patent laws,2' while, in College Savings
Bank, the Court decided that Congress lacked a similar power under the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, which subjected states to suits
under § 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (the Lanham Act). 293 Both
cases involved the same facts. College Savings Bank marketed "College
Sure" certificates of deposit to finance a college education, and it held
the patent on the method of administrating its certificates. Florida
Prepaid, an arm of the Florida government, managed a tuition
prepayment program to provide persons with funds to cover future
college expenses. The College Savings Bank sued Florida Prepaid for
patent infringement and a violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
based on misstatements about its tuition savings plan in its brochures
and annual reports.
These two cases vividly illustrate the problems of allowing state
sovereign immunity from federal statutes without a clear constitutional
basis.
The Constitution gives Congress exclusive authority over
patents,' and Congress is the only lawmaker that can regulate
trademarks and unfair competition on a national level. Yet, the Court
has given states total immunity from federal regulation in these areas
(and by implication in countless other areas). A sovereign is not
sovereign if there are major exceptions to its sovereignty in those
spheres where it is supposedly supreme.295
These two cases also demonstrate a clear violation of the rule of the
law. The states are above the law in the areas of patents, trademarks,
and unfair competition, even though they did not make that law. A
citizen that is injured by a state's violation of these laws has no redress.
A clearer violation of the rule of law cannot be found, especially
considering that there was no specific constitutional grounding for the
Court's decision.
Unlike New York, the Guarantee Clause does not apply to this
291. FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2199; College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2219.
292 FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2202.
293. CollegeSavings Bank, 119 S.Ct. at 2233.
294. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
295. In a different context, Justice Kennedy has declared: "[t]hat the states may not
invade the sphere of federal sovereignty is as incontestable, in my view, as the collorary
proposition that the Federal Government must be held within the boundaries of its own
power when it intrudes upon matters reserved to the States." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 841 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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situation. Sovereign immunity is not an essential attribute of a
republican form of government. Moreover, these are laws of general
applicability that only incidentally affect the states.
In sum, this author believes that Congress lacks the power to
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity not to be sued in
federal court without its consent because of the Eleventh Amendment's
clear language. However, the Eleventh Amendment does not give a
state immunity from suits based on federal law in its own courts. There
is nothing in the Constitution to create such an immunity, and general
notions of federalism not grounded in a constitutional provision are not
sufficient to establish state sovereign immunity.
VI. AREAS FOR EXPANSION FOR THE NEW JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

In his Brzonkala concurrence, Judge Wilkinson argued that the
Court should not be "textually selective" in its constitutional
interpretations."' He declared that
it is hard to understand how one can argue for giving capacious
meanings to some constitutional provisions while reading others
out of the document entirely. Here, appellants suggest that we
give a reading that would rob all meaning from the phrase
"Commerce... among the several States," giving Congress a
blanket power simply "To regulate."
It seems patently
inconsistent to argue for a Due Process Clause that means a great
deal and a Commerce Clause that means nothing. How one
clause can be robust and the other anemic is a mystery when
both clauses, after all, are part of our Constitution.'
Above, I argued that the Court should give greater content to the
Guarantee Clause. This section will explore other areas to which the
new judicial activism might apply, including (1) regulation of a state's
relationship to the individual, (2) limitations on a state's authority to
restrict the political process, and (3) regulation of the relation of the
296. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d 894; see also REDISH, supra note 47, at 17-20. ("[S]ince all
constitutional provisions, not merely those protecting individual liberty, are subject to Article
V's supermajoritarian amendment process, there is no basis in either constitutional text or
theory to justify selective judicial abdication." Id. at 20.) Similarly, Professor Redish has
declared that "authorizing the judiciary to pick and choose among the constitution's
provisions for purposes of enforcement on the basis of its own political value system creates
the risk that the courts will at some point choose to ignore the very individual liberty
provisions that these scholars believe deserve vigorous protection." Id. at 164.
297. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820, 894-95 (4th Cir. 1999).
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states!'
The Court breathed new life into the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause in Saenz v. Roe.' Saenz involved a
challenge by welfare recipients to a California statute that limited the
maximum welfare benefits available to residents who had just moved to
the state. California had defended the limitation on the basis that it
would save the program approximately $10.9 million dollars annually
(out of approximately $2.9 billion for the entire program).
The Court struck down the limitation on the ground that it violated
the right to travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment-that is, the right of newly-arrived persons to
enjoy the same privileges and immunities as other citizens of that
state. Under this clause:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; ....
The Clause provides that a United States citizen can become a
citizen of any state by residing there and, thus, obtain the same rights as
any other state citizen.m In other words, a state lacks the power to limit
state citizenship to any persons or classes.3
Although the state tried to justify its limitation on the rational basis
298. Other areas in which the new judicial activism might apply include choice of law in
federal courts, federal common law, and Congress's ability to make offers to states on the
condition that states accept federal regulation. On choice of law in federal courts, see Scott
Fruehwald, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: A Reevaluation, 37 BRANDEIS LJ. 39 (1998).
On limitations on federal common law, see Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the
FederalCourts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263 (1992); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICrION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 2946 (1991); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1985). Concerning the argument that Congress's ability to regulate through the
Spending Clause is unconstitutional, see Baker, supra note 52, at 101-03. ("Congress need
merely attach its otherwise unconstitutional regulations to any one of the large sums of
federal money that it regularly offers the states." IL at 101); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional
FederalSpending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995). See also Krotoszynski, supra
note 2, at 14-18; Stewart, supra note 86, at 917.
299. 119 S. Ct. at 1518.

300. See id. at 1526-28.
301. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, cl. 1.
302. See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1526.

303. See id.
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of savings to the program, the Court thought that the state could not
accomplish this end by the discriminatory means it had employed.' It
declared that "the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
expressly equates citizenship with residence: '[t]hat Clause does not
provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of citizenship based on
length of residence.'" Nor, does the Clause allow a state to classify
citizens based on their prior residence's location.3
The court
concluded: "In short, the State's legitimate interest in saving money
provides no justification for its decision to discriminate among equally
eligible citizens."'
Saenz demonstrates one consequence of the new judicial activism. If
the states are going to have greater power in relation to the federal
government, the Court needs to look at state actions that regulate
individuals more closely. Moreover, since interstate mobility is one of
the justifications for federalism, the Court must scrutinize state actions
that affect persons who move into a state under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Another area in which the Court might give state actions greater
scrutiny is state restrictions on the political process. In Romer v. Evans,
the Court invalidated a Colorado state constitutional amendment that
severely limited a group's rights to employ the political process.' In
this case, an initiative had added the following amendment to the
Colorado Constitution:
"Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce
any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any
minority status,quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination."
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion struck down this amendment as
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

See id. at 1528.
Id. (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982)).
See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1528.
Id. at 1529.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
309. Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. amend. II).
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violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause under
the rational basis test.310 He declared that
the amendment imposes a special disability upon... [gays and
lesbians] alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that
others enjoy or may seek without constraint .... These are
protections taken for granted by most people either because they
already have them or do not need them; these are protections
against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions
and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free
society.?
He later asserted that "[c]entral both to the idea of the rule of law
and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the
principle that government and each of its parts remain open on
"A
impartial terms to all who seek its assistance., 31 2 He concluded:
31 3
laws."
its
to
stranger
a
persons
of
class
a
deem
so
State cannot
I agree with Justice Scalia's dissent that a community has the right to
protect "traditional sexual mores against the efforts of politically
powerful minorit[ies.]" 34 However, I believe that the citizens of
Colorado did this in an improper manner in the challenged amendment
because they cut off the normal methods of political recourse to a
discrete group. A community should be able to prohibit polygamy or
same-sex marriage or refuse to extend its anti-discrimination laws to
gays and lesbians. However, a community should not be able to cut off
the political avenues to change those laws should a majority in the
community desire that change. In addition, Bowers v. Hardwick has no
effect on this argument.3 5 Bowers held that the Constitution does not
provide protection for homosexual conduct; it does not prevent gays and
lesbians from seeking legislative protection for those activities. Such
political redress is the essence of our governmental system.
Justice Scalia was concerned that "because those who engage in
homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in
310. Id. at 631. The rational basis test is that "if a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears
a rational relation to some legitimate end." Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 633.
313. Id. at 635.
314. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
315. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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certain communities, and of course care about homosexual-rights issues
much more ardently than the public at large, they possess political
31 6
power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide.
This author does not view this concern as a reason for upholding the
amendment. First, that gays and lesbians feel strongly about their
interests does not distinguish them from any other special interest
group. Our political system does not put broad restrictions on special
interest groups. Second, that gays and lesbians reside in certain areas
and thus may be better able to have their views heard in those areas is
not a justification for the amendment. It is a central tenet of this paper
that the new judicial activism deals well with the diversity in our society
because it allows greater decision making on the local level. This author
does not see how Coloradans in general are harmed if Aspen has passed
an anti-discrimination law that protects homosexuals; Aspen's laws do
not extend beyond its political borders. On the other hand, by allowing
local diversity, gays and lesbians can find a community in which their
views can be heard.
I also agree with Justice Scalia that the Court should not take sides
in the culture wars, and he might be right that part of the majority's
reasoning takes sides. 7 However, as I noted above, if we concentrate
on the part of Justice Kennedy's opinion that discusses the amendment's
interference with normal political processes, we can find a basis for the
opinion that is grounded in constitutional text, not politics. 318 If the
states are to be given greater power in the new judicial activism, the
Constitution must protect individuals from misuse of that power.
Another area in which the Court should scrutinize state actions more
closely involves the relationship of the states. While the Court usually
has examined a state's attempt to regulate interstate commerce
closely,319 in other areas, the Court has placed almost no controls on the
relations of the states.
One area in which the Court has abdicated its duties concerning the
316. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (citations omitted).
317. See id. at 652.
318. Romer's meaning has been hotly debated. Compare Louis Michael Seidman,
Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 S. Cr. REV. 67
(1996), with Richard F. Duncan, "They Call me 'Eight Eyes"': Hardwick's Respectability,
Romer's Narrowness,and Same-Sex Marriage,32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 241,244 (1998).
319. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac. Co.
v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); see also TRIBE, supra note 46, at 435 ("[I]n
cases of actual conflict, however, the Court has been extremely severe in its scrutiny of state
action.").
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relationship of the states is in choice of law.3' The Court's current rule
concerning constitutional limitations on state choice of law under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause is minimal: a "[s]tate must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."32' As this
standard has been applied, the Court will uphold a state's choice of law
as long as a state has almost any connection to the case.
In the above standard, the Court has given almost no content to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and Due Process Clause in relationship to
choice of law.32 For example, the Full Faith and Credit Clause provides,
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof.32
Obviously, the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to "acts" (state
case law and statutes). However, the Court has given a great deal of
content to the full faith and credit clause in relation to judicial
proceedings (judgments), but almost none in relation to acts (state
laws). In other words, the Court is being textually selective.
Not only does the court's minimal constraint on choice of law violate
the clear structural requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it
320. I have treated this problem in detail elsewhere. See Scott Fruehwald, Constitutional
Constraints on State Choice of Law, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 39 (1998) [hereinafter
Fruehwald, Constitutional Constraints];see also Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and SameSex Marriage,FLA. L. REV., in press (1999). In this paper, I will concentrate on this issue in

relation to the new judicial activism.
321. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302,313 (1981).
322. I will not deal with the Due Process Clause in depth here because it does not relate
to the relationship of the states. However, I will note that the relationship of the Due Process
Clause to choice of law resembles that of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to the grant of
state benefits in Saenz; the Due Process Clause is not a limitation on state sovereignty in
relation to other states, but a limitation on what law a state can apply to the individual. In
other words, this author believes that when the Court places minimal constraints on the law a
state can apply to the individual, it is being textually selective. The state gives much greater
due process protection to a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction than it does to a state's
choice of law that is to be applied to that individual. See Fruehwald, Constitutional
Constraints,supra note 320, at 56. Does a litigant have a greater interest in the law to be
applied to the case than to the place of the trial? For more on due process constraints on

choice of law, see id. at 65-72.
323. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
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contravenes general notions of horizontal federalism. As the Supreme
Court has recently declared, the Clause's purpose
to alter the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created
under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and
to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which
a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right,
irrespective of the state of its origin."32
"was

Ignoring the Full Faith and Credit Clause's structural mandate and
general notions of horizontal federalism creates the danger that a state
will exceed its sovereignty-a danger that resembles the one when
vertical federalism is not properly balanced. As one court has stated:
[T]o vest the power of determining the extraterritorial effect of a
State's own laws and judgments in the State itself risks the very
kind of parochial entrenchment on the interests of other states
that it was the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
other provisions of Art. IV of the Constitution to prevent.m
The solution to this problem is to give the Full Faith and Credit
Clause substantial meaning, as two scholars, including the present
author, have previously advocated.326 As Douglas Laycock has declared:
A state does not own some credit, partial credit, or credit where
it would be wholly unreasonable to deny credit, which seems to
be the Supreme Court's current interpretation. Rather, each
state owes full faith and credit to the law of sister states. Full
faith and credit is what a state accords its own law ....

Thus, the

Clause is most plausibly read as requiring each state to give the
law of every other state the same faith and credit it gives its own
law-to
treat the law of sister states as equal in authority to its
327
own.

324. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Milwaukee
County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268,277 (1935)).
325. Thomas v. Washington Gas & Light Co., 448 U.S. 261,272 (1980).
326. See Fruehwald, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 320, at 72-74; Douglas
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundationsof
Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249,296 (1992).
327. Laycock, supra note 326, at 296.
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Professor Laycock's declaration gives the Full Faith and Credit Clause
substantial meaning without reading too much into the text.
The Supreme Court has recently given greater attention to the
Constitution's structural lines that regulate the relations of the states in
a case in which it applied a seemingly heightened substantive due
process standard to an Alabama punitive damages award. In BMW of
America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court invalidated an excessive punitive
damages verdict because the state did not have a legitimate interest in
imposing such damages and because the award interfered with other
states' sovereignty32
The decision involved an automobile distributor's failure to disclose
that it had repainted the plaintiff's new car prior to delivery. 3" The
distributor had adopted a nationwide policy of not revealing predelivery
damage to buyers when the damage was less than three percent of the
car's suggested retail price, and it claimed at trial that the plaintiff's
automobile was as good as if it had a factory finish. The jury verdict
gave the plaintiff $4000 compensatory damages and four million dollars
punitive damages.
On a post-trial motion to set aside the punitive damages, the
distributor asserted that its nondisclosure policy conformed with the
laws of approximately half the states. It argued that because its conduct
was legal in those states, Alabama could not use its actions in those
jurisdictions to assess punitive damages against it. The trial judge
disagreed and denied the motion. Although the Alabama Supreme
Court reduced the damages because they had been improperly
calculated, it rejected the distributor's argument that the award violated
due process.
In holding that the punitive damages violated the Due Process
Clause, Justice Stevens observed, "[p]unitive damages may properly be
imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful
conduct and deterring its repetition."33 ' A state should have flexibility in
calculating punitive damages as long as the damages are needed to
vindicate a state's legitimate interests of punishment and deterrence."
"Only when an award can fairly be categorized as 'grossly excessive' in
relation to these interests does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

See BMW of America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,575-76 (1996).
Id. at 569-72.
See id. at 562-65.
Id. at 568.
See id.
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violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 333 In
addition, as Justice Stevens declared, a state cannot impose its policy on
its neighbors.' Not only is a state limited by the federal power over
interstate commerce, it "is also constrained by the need to respect the
interests of other States."'335 Consequently, "it follows from these
principles of state sovereignty and comity that a State may not impose
economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing
the tortfeasor's lawful conduct in other States., 33
Similarly,
"[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also the severity of the
penalty that a state may impose."337
Based on these principles, Justice Stevens struck down the punitive
damages award. He held that (1) the distributor's conduct did "not
establish the high degree of culpability that warrant[ed] a substantial
punitive damages award," (2) the ratio of compensatory to punitive
damages was suspicious, and (3) the award exceeded criminal and civil
penalties for similar conduct. 3m
While Gore only directly affects a state's ability to assess punitive
damages, its notion that states must respect other states' interests
provides a basis for further development in the area of horizontal
federalism.339 While previous cases have focused on vertical federalism,
there is also a great need to police the relation of the states.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE NEW JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN PRACTICE

I enthusiastically share Judge Wilkinson's optimism in the new

judicial activism. However, as I demonstrated above, the new judicial
activism in practice has been inconsistent, and some decisions have
violated some of its basic theoretical tenets. 40
The new judicial activism in theory is a healthy reaction to the
333. Id.
334. See id. at 570-71.
335. Id. at 571.
336. Id. at 572.
337. Id. at 574.
338. See id. at 580.
339. Of course, Gore used the wrong clause to do this since "due process has nothing to
do with the relations among the states." See Fruehwald, Constitutional Constraints,supra
note 320 at 58-59. However, the Court could have grounded that portion of its decision in the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.
340. As Professor Krotoszynski has observed, "[a] second condition precedent exists for
federalism to work: it must be principled." Krotoszynski, supra note 2, at 22.
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Court's previous failure to police the structural lines inherent in the
Constitution. In practice, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
properly applied the tenets of the new judicial activism to strike down
statutes that have exceeded Congress's power to enact them in cases
such as Lopez, Brzonkala, and Boerne. In other cases in which
Congress forced state legislatures to enact statues or commandeered
local officials, it made the correct decision, but on the wrong grounds.
Finally, in those cases inwhich the Court has held that Congress cannot
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity in state court, the Court has
ignored the basic tenet of the new judicial activism that the Court should
not invalidate a statute unless that invalidation is based on the clear
constitutional text.
As Judge Wilkinson observed, the decisions of the new judicial
activism have been substantively neutral, and they have arisen out of a
variety of factual contexts. Courts using this philosophy have struck
down both liberal and conservative statutes, on subjects ranging from
laws relating to violence against woman and the environment to laws
protecting religion. There is no indication that any of these decisions
have been based on the content of the laws being examined. Moreover,
there is nothing in these decisions that prevents the proper sovereign
from enacting similar laws.
Unlike the earlier periods of judicial activism, the cases of the new
judicial activism have tended not to be textually selective. They have
given meaning to all provisions of the Constitution, without going to the
extreme. For example, the new Commerce Clause jurisprudence gives
the Clause broad meaning, but still places limits on Congress's powers
under the Clause. However, as pointed out above, the Court did violate
the textual limitations of the new judicial activism in Alden and the
other sovereign immunity cases by giving the Eleventh Amendment a
breadth not justified by its clear language.
This author believes that the most important aspect of the new
judicial activism is its ability to protect individuals without employing a
substantive bias. As Professor Redish has declared, "[t]he concept of a
prophylactic is that it prevents the creation of a critical situation, by
proceeding on the assumption that it will be impossible to determine, in
the individual instance, the existence of a real threat to the values
sought to be fostered. "'" Similarly, John Rawls has advocated that the
determination of whether something is fair should be made behind a veil
of ignorance:
341. REDISH, supra note 47, at 115.
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A practice is just if it is in accordance with the principles which
all who participate in it might reasonably be expected to propose
or acknowledge before one and other when they are similarly
circumstanced and required to make a firm commitment in
advance without knowledge of what will be the particular
conditions.2
What would people commit to in advance: (1) a system of determining
rights that was substantively biased in an unpredictable way or (2) a
system that neutrally enforced the structures that were intended to
protect individual rights?
In sum, the new judicial activism holds great promise for American
jurisprudence. Because it is allocative, rather than substantive, it allows
courts to give meaning to the Constitution without taking sides. It also
furthers democracy by permitting the appropriate lawmaker to make
political decisions. Hopefully, courts will adhere to its theoretical
principles, and ground their decisions in the Constitutional text, rather
than making sweeping decisions based on general notions of federalism,
like the Court did in the sovereign immunity cases. For if the courts
respect these principles, our legal system may have a method to deal
with the great diversity that exists in the modem world.

342. John Rawls, Justice as Fairnessin JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 80, 98 (Frederick
A. Olafson ed., 1961).

